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I. A CALL FOR ACCOUNTABILITY 
Joseph Kony has earned the dubious moniker of the worst 
human rights offender in Africa. The Lord’s Resistance Army 
(“LRA”), led by Chairman Kony, waged a 28-year campaign of terror 
ranging over a large swath of Central Africa and has led to the death, 
injury and displacement of millions of people in northern Uganda, 
southern Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (“DRC”), and 
the Central African Republic (“CAR”). 2  Although Kony initially 
mounted a traditional rebellion against the central government in 
Kampala, imposing a high cost on the Acholi region of northern 
Uganda, his later attacks used terror tactics often launched from 
sanctuary in either southern Sudan or the DRC.3 In fact, Kony’s later 
                                                                                                                                           
2. The LRA originated in the ethnic Acholi districts of northern Uganda in the late 
1980s. Initially, after the 1986 fall of Milton Obote’s government in Kampala, Alice 
Lakwena’s Holy Spirit Movement and its military wing the Holy Spirit Mobile Force 
(“HSMF”) emerged as an opposition group purporting to represent Acholi interests. Her 
organization fell apart in 1987-88 and her nephew, Joseph Kony, eventually formed the LRA 
with remnants of the HSMF. The LRA Crisis Tracker, managed by Invisible Children and 
Resolve, both non-profit organizations dedicated to increasing awareness about the LRA 
conflict, provide a useful resource for assessing Kony’s recent terror campaign. LRA CRISIS 
TRACKER, available at http://www.lracrisistracker.com/ (last visited Jan. 14, 2015).  
3. Initially, the LRA could have been characterized as a rebel/insurgent group that used a 
military-focus strategy, an approach that called for initial military action against government 
targets and delayed political consolidation until final victory. BARD O’NEILL, INSURGENCY & 
TERRORISM: INSIDE MODERN REVOLUTIONARY WARFARE 41–45 (2d ed. 2001). In 1994, 
Kony made a major change of strategy, developing a support relationship with Sudan, 
switching to terror tactics against the Acholi people, and abducting children. Sudan supplied 
Kony with training, equipment, and sanctuary, likely as a proxy in its own fight against the 
Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement/Army (“SPLM/A”) and probably because Ugandan 
President Yoweri Museveni was supporting the SPLM/A. MAREIKE SCHOMERUS, THE 
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terror campaign was a contributing factor to the 1998 to 2003 conflict 
between Uganda and the DRC, which led to the 2005 judgment 
against Uganda in the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”).4 Kony’s 
campaign also brought increased attention to the LRA on the part of 
the international community, to include regional governments, non-
governmental organizations, the United States, and the United 
Nations, and its mission in the DRC.5 
This article initially examines whether the Uganda-LRA conflict 
is best characterized as a non-international armed conflict within the 
meaning of the Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions6 and 
the 1977 Additional Protocol II. This conflict typology determination 
has important consequences for assessing the nature of the offenses, 
adjudicatory fora, and appropriate punishments. Indeed, to a certain 
extent, the conflict could also be described as a transnational armed 
conflict, in that the LRA has changed from a rebel group representing 
Acholi interests in northern Uganda against the government in 
Kampala, to a terror organization that has conducted large scale 
rampages against innocent civilians and is currently fighting for its 
existence in isolated areas of the DRC and southeastern CAR. Despite 
its origins as a criminal organization responsible for wide-ranging 
offenses under the Ugandan Penal Code, Kony’s LRA is probably 
                                                                                                                                           
LORD’S RESISTANCE ARMY IN SUDAN: A HISTORY AND OVERVIEW 24–33 (2007). Kony 
turned against the Acholi people, likely because he blamed them for the LRA’s reverses, 
initiating a systematic terror campaign against them. In any case, the switch from 
rebel/insurgent to terror tactics destroyed his claim for moral or political legitimacy either in 
northern Uganda or with the international human rights community. O’Neill describes this 
kind of reciprocal relationship involving support to an opponent’s internal rebellion as a 
“mirror image” problem. See id. 
4.  Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo. 
v. Uganda), Judgment, 2005 I.C.J. Rep. 167 (Dec. 19). 
5. The UN Security Council has condemned the attacks on civilians, as well as the 
human rights violations by the LRA in two separate resolutions. See S.C. Res. 1653, § 8 (Jan. 
27, 2006); S.C. Res. 1663, § 7 (Mar. 24, 2006). 
6. See Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and 
Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter 
Geneva Convention I]; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of 
Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 
3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Geneva Convention II]; Geneva Convention Relative to the 
Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter 
Geneva Convention III];  Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in 
Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva Convention 
IV]. 
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best characterized as an “organized armed group” 7  with many 
members subject to prosecution for serious crimes under domestic 
law, as well as war crimes and crimes against humanity under 
international humanitarian, for a wide range of offenses. 8  While 
Uganda does not come to the table with clean hands, neither can its 
alleged crimes be compared with the widespread atrocities committed 
by the LRA; nonetheless, the obligations of international 
humanitarian law (“IHL”) apply equally to both sides of the conflict. 
The interests of justice will, no doubt, require an equally broad range 
of legal responses. 
This article raises important questions about how the 
international community can assist African governments in achieving 
accountability for jus in bello (war crimes) violations—accountability 
that would be widely perceived as legitimate by the affected peoples 
and thereby further the long-term interests of international peace and 
security. This article argues that Ugandan criminal law, to include its 
                                                                                                                                           
7. The 1977 Additional Protocol II applies to conflicts “which take place in the territory 
of a High Contracting Party between its armed forces and dissident armed forces or other 
organized armed groups which, under responsible command, exercise such control over a part 
of its territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and concerted military operations and to 
implement this Protocol.” Protocol II Additional to the Geneva Conventions of Aug. 12, 1949, 
and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, art. 1, June 8, 
1977, 1125 U.N.S.T. 609 [hereinafter AP II]. Uganda’s accession to Additional Protocol II 
was effective Sept. 13, 1991. See UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, 
https://treaties.un.org/ (last visited June 19, 2015). By its terms under Article II, Additional 
Protocol II does not apply to a range of internal disturbances, which raises an issue regarding 
the demarcation between a law enforcement problem and a non-international armed conflict. 
The 1977 Additional Protocol I applies to international armed conflicts, or conflicts between 
two or more states, as well as “armed conflicts which peoples are fighting against colonial 
domination and alien occupation and against racist regimes in the exercise of their right of 
self-determination. . . .” Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of Aug. 12, 1949, and 
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts art. 1(4), June 8, 1977, 
1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter AP I]. Uganda’s accession to Additional Protocol I was effective 
September 13, 1991. See UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, supra. However, there has 
been no claim that Kony is fighting against colonial domination, an alien occupation, or a 
racist regime in Kampala. 
8. Uganda still recognizes the death penalty for serious crimes, despite international 
pressure to eliminate the practice. The Uganda Penal Code Act of June 15, 1950 imposes the 
death penalty for a wide range of offenses, including treason, rape, murder, the defilement of a 
girl under the age of 18, and kidnapping. Uganda has ratified the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”) of December 19, 1966, but not the Second Optional 
Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights that seeks to abolish the 
death penalty. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, available at 
http://indicators.ohchr.org/ (last visited June 15, 2015). 
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penal statutes, the Amnesty Law, and the 2006 legislation that created 
a War Crimes Court, have significant shortcomings that would 
preclude effective accountability for the full range of offenses.9 This 
article further argues that the International Criminal Court (“ICC”) 
cannot—for a range of jurisdictional and substantive reasons—
provide an effective forum for adjudicating the range of offenses 
committed in this conflict. This article concludes that the ICC should 
establish an agreement-based (i.e., a treaty) hybrid tribunal to 
prosecute war crimes committed over the course of the Uganda-LRA 
conflict from 1987 to the present.  
II. THE UGANDA-LRA CONFLICT 
A. A Short History of the Conflict 
The insurgency in northern Uganda has its roots in the 
marginalization of certain ethnic groups in the northern districts after 
President Yoweri Museveni and the National Resistance 
Movement/Army (“NRM/A”) came to power in 1986.10 The NRM/A 
was touted as an alternative to multi-party democracy and was based 
in southern Uganda. At first, both politically and spiritually motivated 
resistance groups opposed the southern-dominated NRM. The LRA 
then emerged in 1987, initially claiming to be fighting to free the 
Acholi people of northern Uganda by overthrowing the Ugandan 
government and installing a regime governed by Kony’s 
interpretation of the Ten Commandments.11 Around 1992 to 1994, 
Kony turned against the Acholi, who he apparently blamed for the 
LRA’s reverses, initiating a systematic terror campaign against 
them.12 In fact, the Acholi refer to the LRA as “Otong tong,” meaning 
“cut” in the Luo dialect, with the implication that the LRA mutilated 
people.13 
                                                                                                                                           
9. ICC Bill: Why did MPs trap Museveni and save Kony?, INDEPENDENT (Kampala), 
Mar. 31, 2010, allafrica.com/stories/201003310540.html (last visited Jan. 8, 2015).  
10. ROBERT GERSONY, THE ANGUISH OF NORTHERN UGANDA: RESULTS OF A FIELD-
BASED ASSESSMENT OF THE CIVIL CONFLICTS IN NORTHERN UGANDA (1997), available at 
http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/Pnacc245.pdf.  
11 . OPIYIO OLOYA, CHILD TO SOLDIER: STORIES FROM JOSEPH KONY’S LORD’S 
RESISTANCE ARMY  58 (2013). 
12. Id. at 63-64. 
13. In fact, LRA brutality was often symbolic, such as cutting off ears or lips as a 
warning to others against cooperating with the Government of Uganda (“GoU”). Ruddy Doom 
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Since 1994 the LRA’s terror campaign has targeted Ugandan 
civilians, Uganda People’s Defence Force (“UPDF”) units, Sudanese 
civilians living near the Ugandan border, Sudanese People’s 
Liberation Army fighters, and international personnel working in 
LRA affected areas. This terror campaign alienated many Acholi. 
Finally, Kony proceeded to abduct children as recruits so that his 
group could form the nucleus of a new Acholi identity. Indeed, Kony 
achieved international notoriety for his widespread practice of 
abducting children, typically forcing young boys to become soldiers 
and awarding young girls as wives to his officers. 
B. The Nature of the Criminal Offenses 
This long-standing and wide ranging conflict has resulted in a 
range of IHL claims against both the LRA and the UPDF. In some 
cases, the LRA members and UPDF soldiers have reportedly violated 
the Ugandan Criminal Code, while in other cases there have been 
reports of war crimes and crimes against humanity committed against 
civilians. Nonetheless, Kony and his senior leaders likely bear 
primary (command) responsibility for much of the criminal 
behavior.14 In any case, although the available information indicates 
that Kony and others may have committed the serious crimes of 
which they are accused, a fair trial by an impartial tribunal is needed 
to test the reliability of this information, to determine whether proper 
evidence establishes guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and if so to 
determine the appropriate sentence. 
Kony and the senior leadership of the LRA have been accused of 
widespread and continuing violations of IHL. The LRA is likely 
responsible for a wide range of criminal acts, crimes against 
                                                                                                                                           
and Koen Vlassenrot, Kony’s Message: A New Koine? AFRICAN AFF.  (Jan. 1, 1999), 
http://truth_addict.blogspot.com/2012/03/african-affairs-1999-konys-message-new.html. 
14. Under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Kony and his leaders 
would be criminally responsible for the acts of subordinates in that they “either knew or, 
owing to the circumstances at the time, should have known that the forces were committing or 
about to commit such crimes,” and “failed to take all necessary and reasonable measures 
within his or her power to prevent or repress their commission or to submit the matter to the 
competent authorities for investigation and prosecution.” See Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90, art. 28 (July 7, 1998) [hereinafter Rome Statute]. Uganda 
ratified the Rome Statute on June 14, 2002. UN Treaty Collection, available at 
https://treaties.un.org (last visited Aug. 27, 2015). 
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humanity, and war crimes over the past twenty-seven years.15 These 
crimes include the murder, abduction, rape, and mutilation of untold 
numbers of people, creating a reign of terror in northern Uganda that 
lasted over twenty years and left almost two million persons displaced 
from their homes. In addition, there is credible evidence that the LRA 
engaged in the indiscriminate use of anti-personnel mines, likely 
supplied by Sudan.16 Later, after the UPDF attacked the LRA camps 
in December of 2008, the LRA resumed its terror campaign against 
civilians largely west and away from Uganda, through parts of the 
DRC, the CAR and southern Sudan.17 The Government of Uganda 
(“GoU”), various non-government organizations, and the ICC have 
amassed significant evidence of these crimes, as well as Kony’s 
responsibility for much—if not all—of the staggering human cost that 
has resulted from this conflict.18 
The Ugandan security forces, including both the UPDF and the 
Ugandan Police, have also been accused of a range of criminal 
offenses in northern Uganda over the past twenty-five years. It is not 
clear, however, whether any of the claimed offenses rise to the level 
                                                                                                                                           
15. Under Article 7 of the Rome Statute, the crime against humanity “means any of the 
following acts when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against 
any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack:” murder, extermination, enslavement, 
imprisonment, torture, rape, and other specified acts. There is a wealth of evidence that Kony 
and his senior leaders have planned and directed widespread acts against the civilian 
populations of a four-nation region over a protracted period of time. See Rome Statute, supra 
note 14. Under Article 8 of the statute, war crimes are defined as grave breaches of the Geneva 
Conventions, as well as “serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in international 
armed conflict. . . .” Id. 
16 . AVSI, MINE RISK EDUCATION AND VICTIM SUPPORT IN NORTHERN UGANDA, 
REPORT (Aug. 31, 2005), http://reliefweb.int/report/uganda/mine-risk-education-and-victim-
support-northern-uganda. This reliable report indicates that unmarked anti-personnel mines 
were often used to target civilians with emplacement near villages, water sources, and foot 
paths. Such usage violates the basic IHL principles of necessity, distinction, and 
proportionality; anti-personnel mines have long been considered problematic because innocent 
civilians can be injured long after military forces and rebels have departed an area. This leads 
to the question of where the mines came from: either the mines were planted by the UPDF or 
were supplied to the rebels by another country, such as Sudan. In any case, both Uganda and 
Sudan have ratified the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (the Ottawa Treaty); Uganda 
ratified the treaty on February 25, 1999 and Sudan ratified it on October 13, 2003. See UN 
Treaty Collection, available at https://treaties.un.org (last visited Aug. 27, 2015). 
17 . See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE CHRISTMAS MASSACRE: LRA ATTACKS ON 
CIVILIANS IN NORTHERN CONGO (2009). 
18. ICC, Case Information Sheet, The Prosecutor v. Joseph Kony, Vincent Otti, and 
Okot Odhiambo (2015) ICC-02/04-01/05, https://www.icc-cpi.int/uganda/kony/Documents/
KonyEtAlEng.pdf (last visited Aug. 17, 2015). 
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of war crimes, much less “grave breaches” or crimes against 
humanity, at least within the context of a Common Article 3 non-
international armed conflict. In general terms, the Ugandan security 
forces have been accused of using child soldiers,19 the detention and 
use of children for intelligence gathering purposes,20 and the herding 
of the Acholi population into displaced persons camps where they 
were subjected to difficult living conditions.21  
Arguably, some government actions could be justified under the 
principle of military necessity, while other actions—at least at the 
individual level—could be described as criminal actions punishable 
                                                                                                                                           
19. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, STOLEN CHILDREN: ABDUCTION AND RECRUITMENT IN 
NORTHERN UGANDA 15 (Mar. 2003), https://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/uganda0303/uganda 
0403.pdf (last visited June 15, 2015). Human Rights Watch reports that the UPDF has, at least 
in the past, recruited children for local defense units and to fight the LRA. Uganda’s 2002 
Declaration on Ratification of the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict provides: “The Government of the 
Republic of Uganda declares that the minimum age for the recruitment of persons into the 
armed forces is by law set at eighteen (18) years. Recruitment is entirely and squarely 
voluntary and is carried out with the full informed consent of the persons being recruited. 
There is no conscription in Uganda.” See UN Treaty Collection, available at 
https://treaties.un.org (last visited Aug. 27, 2015). In addition, the 2005 UPDF Act, Article 52 
(c) sets the minimum age for military recruitment as “at least 18 years of age.” Id. 
20 . CHILD SOLDIERS INTERNATIONAL, CHILD SOLDIERS GLOBAL REPORT (2008), 
https://www.hrw.org/legacy/pub/2008/children/Child_Soldiers_Global_Report_Summary.pdf. 
Recent reports indicate that the UPDF once had 1,130 child soldiers in its ranks, although the 
UPDF notes that it can be difficult to know someone’s actual age (i.e., the lack of birth 
certificates). CHILD SOLDIERS INTERNATIONAL, LOUDER THAN WORDS – AN AGENDA FOR 
ACTION TO END STATE USE OF CHILD SOLDIERS (2012). 
21. Patrick Wegner, A Genocide in Northern Uganda – The ‘Protected Camps’ Policy of 
1999 to 2006, JUSTICE IN CONFLICT, https://justiceinconflict.org/2012/04/09/a-genocide-in-
northern-uganda-the-protected-camps-policy-of-1999-to-2006/ (last visited June 16, 2015). 
Some writers have described the camps policy as crimes against humanity, inhumane acts, or 
even genocide, but these claims are probably overstated especially since the Genocide 
Convention requires a specific intent to eliminate an ethnic or racial group and there is no 
evidence to that effect. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide, art. 2, 9 (December 1984) (Uganda’s accession was effective on Nov. 14, 1995), 
UN Treaty Collection, available at https://treaties.un.org (last visited Aug. 27, 2015) 
[hereinafter The Genocide Convention]. In any case, while the government moved people into 
the camps as a security measure against the LRA, it also provided minimal services and 
eventually received considerable support from the international community. According to the 
UN High Commissioner for Refugees, the camp population peaked in 2005 with 1.84 million 
people in 241 camps. And, since most people have now returned to their original homes, the 
UNHCR closed its office in northern Uganda in 2012. UNHCR closes chapter on Uganda’s 
internally displaced people, UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES (Jan. 6, 
2012), http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/news/briefing/2012/1/4f06e2a79/unhcr-closes-chapter-
ugandas-internally-displaced-people.html. 
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under the Ugandan Penal Code. For example, there is considerable 
practical merit, if not military necessity, to permitting the use of 
teenage boys to defend their own homes/villages or to using recently 
escaped children to help track down their former abductors. And 
historically, the movement of population groups into protected camps 
has been seen as a very effective way of “draining the swamp” against 
rebel groups trying to exploit them.22 Nevertheless, many of these 
tactics may violate the law. Regardless, in order to advance long-term 
peace and security in northern Uganda, all criminal activity—whether 
committed by LRA soldiers or Ugandan security forces—should be 
investigated and prosecuted to the fullest extent of the law. While the 
ICC has indicated that it would investigate complaints against the 
UPDF, the court noted that it lacked jurisdiction since most alleged 
criminal acts had reportedly occurred prior to the July 2002 entry into 
force of the Rome Statute.23 Nonetheless, the court has not released 
any reports or filed any indictments against government personnel, 
even for offenses post-dating July 1, 2002. 
C. Ugandan Initiatives against the LRA 
Uganda has pursued important legal initiatives in its fight against 
the LRA. In 1999 Uganda and Sudan signed the Nairobi Agreement, 
which committed the two countries to cease hostilities against each 
other and to end support to any rebel groups operating from each 
other’s territory.24 In January of 2000 President Museveni signed an 
Amnesty Act into law that has reportedly induced 26,000 rebels to 
                                                                                                                                           
22. The phrase “draining the swamp” refers to the practice of moving population groups 
from a conflict area, in an effort to separate insurgents/guerrillas from any base of popular 
support. While this practice can help identify rebels who may be hiding among the civilians 
and to focus combat operations against them, it can also be counterproductive in terms of 
encouraging popular disaffection from the government, especially if the move is made in a 
heavy-handed manner or essential services are not provided. See, for example, the British 
experience in Malaya during the 1950s. See JOHN A. NAGL, LEARNING TO EAT SOUP WITH A 
KNIFE: COUNTERINSURGENCY LESSONS FROM MALAYA AND VIETNAM (2002). 
23. Samson Ntale, ICC to investigate Ugandan army, CNN (June 3, 2010), 
http://www.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/africa/06/03/uganda.army.icc/. In fact, ICC prosecutor 
Luis Moreno-Ocampo indicated that any allegations of UPDF offenses pre-dating July 1, 2002 
should be taken before Uganda’s High Court. Id. 
24. Paul Jackson, The March of the Lord’s Resistance Army: Greed or Grievance in 
Northern Uganda?, SMALL WARS & INSURGENCIES 13 (2002). 
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defect to the GoU.25 This law provides amnesty for “any Ugandan 
who has at any time since the 26th day of January 1986 engaged in or 
is engaging in war or armed rebellion against the government of the 
Republic of Uganda . . . .”26 In March of 2002 Uganda and Sudan also 
signed a bilateral protocol that allowed the UPDF to conduct cross-
border operations against the LRA camps in southern Sudan, further 
increasing the pressure on the rebels.27 
In December of 2003, Uganda initiated an important legal effort 
by referring the situation involving the LRA to the ICC. A remarkable 
move on Uganda’s part, this referral was the first state referral of an 
action to the ICC. The referral was also significant because it 
involved offenses within a non-international armed conflict; the 
referral focused international attention on Kony and his senior 
lieutenants. Under the Rome Statute, the ICC has subject matter 
jurisdiction over natural persons involving four crimes: genocide, 
crimes against humanity, war crimes, and the crime of aggression.28 
                                                                                                                                           
25. Undermining the LRA: Role of Uganda’s Amnesty Act, CONCILIATION RESOURCES 
(Aug. 2012), http://www.c-r.org/news-and-views/comment/undermining-lra-role-ugandas-
amnesty-act (last visited Feb. 3, 2015). See Additional Protocol II, supra note 6, art. 6(5) 
(encouraging authorities in power “to grant the broadest possible amnesty to persons who 
participated in the armed conflict”). See also Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, Customary 
International Humanitarian Law, Vol. I: Rules, INT’L COMM. RED CROSS (2005) (Rule 139 
recognizes a rule of customary international law urging states to extend amnesty to participants 
in a non-international armed conflict, except where the person is suspected of a war crime). 
26.  This statute allows a “reporter” seeking amnesty to receive a certificate of amnesty 
in exchange for renouncing and abandoning involvement in war or armed rebellion. The 
Amnesty Act (2000) (Uganda), Part II § 3(1). In addition, the statute creates an Amnesty 
Commission to manage the demobilization, reintegration, and resettlement of reporters. The 
amnesty process has been controversial, with periodic charges that it allows criminally 
culpable persons to escape prosecution and accountability. In 2006, the Uganda Parliament 
amended the act to provide that a person would be ineligible for a grant of amnesty “if he or 
she is declared not eligible by the Minister by statutory instrument made with the approval of 
Parliament.” The Amnesty (Amendment) Act (2006) (Uganda). Part II (the amnesty 
provisions) lapsed on May 23, 2012, but was reenacted in its original form in May 2013. See 
Statutory Instruments (2012) No. 34, The Amnesty Act (Declaration of Lapse of the Operation 
of Part II) Instrument (2012); Ugandan Government Renews Amnesty Policy//IC Citizen, 
INVISIBLE CHILDREN, http://invisiblechildren.com/blog/2013/05/30/ugandan-government-
renews-amnesty-policy-ic-citizen/ (last visited June 12, 2015). 
27 .  Army happy with Sudan protocol on LRA, IRIN NEWS (Mar. 19, 2002), 
http://www.irinnews.org/news/2002/03/19/army-happy-sudan-protocol-lra (last visited Jan. 12, 
2017).  
28. Rome Statute, supra note 14. Under Article 12 and 13, the ICC has jurisdiction only 
if the offenses were committed on the territory of a state party, by a state party or one its 
nationals, or under referral by the UN Security Council. 
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The court has jurisdiction over war crimes “when committed as part 
of a plan or policy or as part of a large-scale commission of such 
crimes,” but only for crimes committed after the statute came into 
effect in July 2002.29  
Subsequently, in September of 2005, the ICC issued arrest 
warrants against Joseph Kony and four of his senior leaders30 for 
crimes against humanity and war crimes. 31  Later, after the 2008 
breakdown in peace negotiations between Kony and the GoU, the 
indictments would help provide the GoU with a political condition 
precedent for renewed military action against the LRA. Finally, on 
May 25, 2010, the Ugandan parliament adopted the International 
Criminal Court Act,32  a statute that allows for the prosecution of 
international crimes in Uganda and cooperation between the GoU and 
the ICC.33 
Uganda has also pursued significant political-military initiatives 
with the LRA that have changed the nature of the conflict. In 
                                                                                                                                           
29. Id. art. 8. Article 8 (e) (vii) also defines the “[c]onscripting or enlisting children 
under the age of fifteen into armed forces or groups or using them to participate actively in 
hostilities” as a serious violation of the laws and customs of war in non-international armed 
conflict.  
30. Vincent Otti (later executed on Kony’s orders in 2007), Raska Lakwena (later killed 
by Ugandan forces in 2006), Okot Odhiambo (LRA deputy commander and still at large), and 
Dominic Ongwen (recently captured by US forces and pending trial at The Hague). 
31. Prosecutor v. Kony, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/05, Warrant of Arrest for Joseph Kony 
Issued on July 8, 2005, as Amended on Sept. 27, 2005; Prosecutor v. Kony (July 8, 2005) Case 
No. ICC-02/04-01/05, Warrant of Arrest for Vincent Otti; Prosecutor v. Kony (July 8, 2005) 
Case No. ICC-02/04-01/05, Warrant of Arrest for Raska Lakwena Issued; Prosecutor v. Kony 
(July 8, 2005) Case No. ICC-02/04-01/05, Warrant of Arrest for Okot Odhiambo; Prosecutor 
v. Kony (July 8, 2005) Case No. ICC-02/04-01/05, Warrant of Arrest for Dominic Ongwen. 
According to the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber II (July 11, 2007) No. ICC-02/04-01/05-248, 
the proceedings against Lakwena have been terminated based upon reliable evidence that he 
was killed on August 12, 2006. The warrants are available on the International Criminal Court 
website, available at  https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/Home.aspx. The warrant against Vincent 
Otti is apparently still valid, even though the LRA has confirmed his death. Uganda’s LRA 
Confirm Otti Death, BBC NEWS (Jan. 23, 2008), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
africa/7204278.stm. On February 16, 2015, Pre-Trial Chamber II severed the proceedings 
against Ongwen from the remaining co-defendants. ICC, Case Information Sheet, The 
Prosecutor v. Dominic Ongwen (Mar. 26, 2015) Case No. ICC-02/04-01/15, https://www.icc-
cpi.int/uganda/ongwen/Documents/ OngwenEng.pdf. 
32. The International Criminal Court Act (2010). 
33. James Ellis & Dan Kuwali, Uganda, 2011 Y.B. INT’L HUMANITARIAN LAW 14, 
Correspondents’ Reports (indicating that there are several notable omissions from the 2010 
ICC Act, including conduct that was not a crime at the time of its commission, a lack of 
provisions on retroactivity, and rules of international law, including IHL, that raise questions 
about fair trial standards). 
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September 2005, as a result of negotiations, LRA elements moved 
into camps in the northeastern DRC and suspended military 
operations.34 Effectively, this brought about a de facto end to the non-
international armed conflict in northern Uganda and the peace there 
that lasts to this day. In August of 2006 the LRA and the GoU signed 
a Cessation of Hostilities Agreement and the parties participated in 
peace talks.35 
In one important effort, the peace delegates signed an Agreement 
on Accountability and Reconciliation. 36  This effort resulted in 
agreement to try serious offenses through formal Ugandan justice 
measures with lesser offenses handled through traditional 
reconciliation practices. In part, this agreement was intended to meet 
the complementary requirements of the Rome Statute, perhaps 
providing a way for Uganda to procure the withdrawal of the ICC 
indictments.37 Kony sent a delegation to negotiate on his behalf, but 
he repeatedly failed to appear in person at announced peace 
conferences, much less sign the negotiated Final Peace Agreement in 
November 2008. 38  Many people questioned whether Kony was 
negotiating in good faith, believing that he never intended to give up 
his fight; others, however, believed that Kony would sign a peace 
agreement but only if the ICC first withdrew the indictments.39 Thus, 
even though Kony and his senior leaders may have refused to sign 
because the pending indictments were not or could not be withdrawn, 
it is also hard to fault the ICC for not doing so as a condition 
precedent to any peace agreement. Nonetheless, after Kony failed to 
                                                                                                                                           
34. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 17.  
35 . LRA-Government Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities, Uganda—The Lord’s 
Resistance Army, Aug. 26, 2006. The parties agreed “to cease all hostile military action aimed 
at each other and any other action that may undermine the Peace Talks,” with the LRA 
assembling in camps in southern Sudan, and agreed that any disputes arising under the 
agreement “shall be resolved by the Mediation Team.” In June 2008 the LRA reportedly 
attacked civilians in southern Sudan, leading the UPDF attack to plan attacks against the LRA 
camps near Garamba National Park. Ugandan Rebels ‘Prepare for War,’ BBC NEWS AFRICA  
(June 6, 2008), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7440790.stm. 
36. Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation, Uganda - The Lord’s Resistance 
Army (June 29, 2007). 
37. See generally Eric S. Fish, Comment, Peace Through Complementarity: Solving the 
Ex Post Problem in International Criminal Court Prosecutions, 119 YALE L. J. 1703 (2010). 
38. Mark Tran, Ugandan Rebel Leader Fails to Sign Peace Deal, GUARDIAN (Apr. 7, 
2008), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/apr/11/uganda. 
39. Mark Kersten, Peace, Justice and Politics in Northern Uganda, EUR. COUNCIL 
FOREIGN AFF. (2013), http://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/IJP_Uganda.pdf. 
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sign the agreement, Uganda went forward with its efforts to 
implement the Juba talks to include establishing the International War 
Crimes Division as a special division of the Ugandan High Court.40 
Eventually, Uganda resumed military operations against him and 
his organization.41 In December of 2008, the UPDF—with permission 
from the DRC—conducted a joint air-ground attack, known as 
Operation Lightning Thunder, 42  on the LRA’s base camps near 
Garamba National Park. 43  While the initial attack was marginally 
successful, it also resulted in a diversion of the LRA activities over a 
much larger area of Northern DRC and into the CAR (namely, west 
and largely away from northern Uganda).44 In 2012, as a result of the 
                                                                                                                                           
40. Kristy McNamara, Seeking Justice in Ugandan Courts: Amnesty and the Case of 
Thomas Kwoyelo, 12 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 653, 658 (2013). 
41. The 1907 Hague Regulations address military-to-military armistice agreements. On 
one hand, Article 40 provides that “[a]ny serious violation of the armistice by one of the 
parties gives the other party the right of denouncing it, and even, in cases of urgency, of 
recommencing hostilities immediately.” On the other hand, perfidy, that is acts inviting an 
adversary’s detrimental reliance on a protected status, has been a traditional concern under 
IHL. See Sean Watts, Law-of-War Perfidy, 219 MIL. L. REV. 106 (2014). Here, it is clear that 
the LRA committed a material breach of the original agreement, both in terms of its renewed 
attacks in southern Sudan and with the movement to new camps near Garamba National Park. 
Nonetheless, Uganda did make further attempts to negotiate with Kony through November 
2008 before launching Operation Lightning Thunder. Hence, it would be difficult to argue that 
the UPDF committed an act of perfidy with its December attack on the camps. 
42 . The Ugandan-led operation included both Sudanese and Congolese soldiers in 
support. Richard Downie, The Lord’s Resistance Army, CTR. STRATEGIC & INT’L STUD. 
(2001), http://csis.org/publication/lords-resistance-army. Arguably, the Uganda-DRC bilateral 
political relationship has been the strategic center of gravity in renewed fight against Kony and 
the changed relationship (from the 1998-2003 period) has been a positive and enduring 
development. 
43. Garamba National Park has been a Congolese park since 1938 under the 
management authority of the Congolese Institute for Nature Conservation (“ICCN”) and has 
been on the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (“UNESCO”) World 
Heritage list since 1980. The park “contains the last worldwide population of the northern 
white rhinoceros, endemic sub-species of Congolese giraffe and a mixed population of 
elephants, combining forest elephants, bush elephants and individuals demonstrating 
morphological characteristics common to the two elephant sub-species.” Garamba National 
Park, UNESCO, http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/136list/136 (last visited Feb. 19, 2015). 
Reportedly, LRA members have poached a range of animals while in search of food. Poaching 
Onslaught in Garamba National Park, AFRICA GEOGRAPHIC (June 13, 2014), 
http://africageographic.com/blog/poaching-onslaught-in-garamba-national-park/ (last visited 
Jan. 12, 2017). In that sense, LRA members may have committed war crimes involving 
cultural property within the meaning of the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of 
Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict. 
44. Ledio Cakaj, On the Heels of Kony: The Untold Tragedy Unfolding in the Central 
African Republic, ENOUGH PROJECT (June 24, 2010), http://www.enoughproject. 
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deteriorating regional situation, the United States deployed special 
operations forces to Obo, in southeastern CAR, to assist with efforts 
to capture Kony and his lieutenants. 45  Overall, Uganda’s actions 
reignited the earlier conflict in a new area and had a significant 
impact on previously unaffected and innocent people. Recently, 
Ongwen, one of Kony’s indicted lieutenants, surrendered to US 
forces, renewing the prospect for an international crimes tribunal that 
might help bring justice to some of his victims.46 Nevertheless, even 
with President Museveni’s efforts to involve the ICC in the fight 
against the LRA, he has still questioned the utility of the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions, as well as the ICC itself, in this conflict with Kony.47 
d. Whither a Transnational Armed Conflict? 
In sum, what began as a non-international armed conflict (a 
rebellion) in northern Uganda has become a regional conflict 
affecting millions of people in a four-country area of Central Africa; a 
conflict that has drawn in members of the international community to 
include the United States, France (in terms of support to the 
Government of the CAR), the UN Mission in the DRC, and the ICC. 
Thus, this conflict can now be considered an internationalized non-
international armed conflict, or a transnational armed conflict, at least 
through the period of 2006 to 2008.48 While this article focuses on 
ensuring accountability, we must first examine the nature of the 
conflict and the combatant status of LRA members before turning to 
the issue of how to achieve that accountability. Indeed, the extent to 
                                                                                                                                           
org/publications/heels-of-joseph-kony-commander-of-lords-resistance-army (last visited Jan. 
12, 2017). 
45. Jeffrey Gettleman, In Vast Jungle, U.S. Troops Aid in Search for Kony, N.Y. TIMES 
(Apr. 29, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/30/world/africa/kony-tracked-by-us-forces-
in-central-africa.html?pagewanted=all. 
46. LRA Rebel Dominic Ongwen Surrenders to U.S. Forces in CAR, BBC NEWS AFRICA 
(Jan. 7, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-30705649. 
47. Yoweri Kaguta Museveni, State of the Nation Address by President of the Republic 
of Uganda Kampala, State House of Uganda (June 5, 2014), transcript available at 
www.statehouse.go.ug/media/presidential-statements/2014/06/05/state-nation-address-he-
yoweri-kaguta-museveni-president-re). See also Jeffrey Gettleman, Senior Rebel from Uganda 
to Be Moved to The Hague, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 13, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/14/
world/africa/ugandan-rebel-commander-to-be-tried-at-international-criminal-court.html. 
48. The term “transnational armed conflict” has no legal significance; the term is not part 
of international humanitarian law. The term reflects the fact that the conflict has the nature of 
both an international and a non-international armed conflict. 
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which the conflict can be characterized as either a non-international or 
an international armed conflict, to include whether LRA members 
have combatant status, has important bearing on whether such 
members can be held accountable for certain offenses under IHL. 
III. CHARACTERIZING THE CONFLICT UNDER 
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 
A. Introduction 
The nature of the conflict with the LRA affects national 
obligations under IHL. The 1949 Geneva Conventions created a 
bifurcated framework, providing for protections in either international 
(Common Article 2) or non-international (Common Article 3) armed 
conflicts. At that time, the drafters were focused primarily on 
international armed conflict and viewed non-international armed 
conflict primarily in terms of a rebellion or civil war within a single 
country. 49  Still, the 1949 Geneva Conventions afforded major 
improvements in the legal protection of victims of international 
conflicts—wars between sovereign nations, while providing limited 
protections to non-combatants in non-international armed conflict.50 
Critically, for the purposes of the Uganda-LRA conflict, Common 
Article 3 provided a less expansive—and less clear—set of 
protections for the wounded and sick, prisoners of war, and civilians 
than it did for Common Article 2 conflicts. Eventually, the 
international community addressed this gap in international law with 
the 1977 Additional Protocol (“AP”) II.51 AP II was designed to make 
international humanitarian law more complete and universal, and to 
provide expanded obligations in a non-international armed conflict. 
The Uganda-LRA conflict raises important issues regarding the 
applicability of domestic and international humanitarian law: the 
                                                                                                                                           
49. GEOFFREY S. CORN ET AL., THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT: AN OPERATIONAL 
APPROACH 45 (2012). 
50. Under Common Article 2 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, an international armed 
conflict is defined as a “declared war or any other armed conflict which may arise between two 
or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not recognized by one of 
them.” Common Article 3 applies “[i]n the case of armed conflict not of an international 
character occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties. . . .” See supra note 
6. 
51. See AP II, supra note 7. 
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conflict began in northern Uganda, involving some level of criminal 
activity (e.g., internal disturbances, rebellion, or insurgency), clearly 
raising issues under the Ugandan Penal Code, and yet the conflict also 
has expanded and evolved to include large sections of Sudan, the 
DRC, and the CAR. This raises controversial questions, at least in 
certain areas of northern Uganda and during certain periods, regarding 
the use of deadly force by UPDF in response to certain LRA 
activities: at what point did the conflict transition from a law 
enforcement problem to a non-international armed conflict warranting 
the application of the IHL? 52  In effect, what began as internal 
disturbances evolved into some level of a non-international armed 
conflict, and eventually spread into a transnational armed conflict.53 
Thus, this conflict raises several important issues regarding the 
applicability of different IHL norms. Among these are the definition 
of non-international armed conflict, the difference between 
                                                                                                                                           
52 . Under general principles of international human rights law (a law enforcement 
paradigm), the UPDF and the Uganda Police would have been limited in the use of deadly 
force based upon a conduct-based standard (e.g., imminent threat to others) for targeting LRA 
members, while the IHL can permit a broader, status-based standard. In any case, The Basic 
Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials (“BPUFF”), 
adopted by the UN Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, Aug. 
27 to Sep. 7, 1990, provides a minimum standard for Ugandan law enforcement operations 
under international human rights law. UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS, OFFICE OF THE HIGH 
COMMISSIONER, BASIC PRINCIPLES ON THE USE OF FORCE AND FIREARMS BY LAW 
ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS (1990), http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/Use
OfForceAndFirearms.aspx. This standard is based in part on the ICCPR, and clearly envisions 
the use of graduated force, with a presumption that law enforcement officers, as well as 
military personnel conducting law enforcement operations, can use deadly force to respond to 
imminent threats. See ICCPR, supra note 8. 
53. A nation, such as Uganda, is often reluctant to recognize that a domestic situation has 
changed from a law enforcement problem to one involving the use of armed forces subject to 
the constraints of IHL. In part, a nation may be reluctant to admit to an inability to enforce its 
own laws with an implicit invitation for international scrutiny over its actions, as well as those 
of its adversary; in part, a nation may also believe that an acknowledgement regarding the 
application of IHL also carries an implicit political recognition of the adversary’s status. 
Andrew J. Carswell, Classifying the Conflict: A Soldier’s Dilemma, 91 INT’L REV. RED 
CROSS, 143, 150 (2009). Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions provides: “The 
application of the preceding provisions shall not affect the legal status of the conflict.” See 
supra note 5. Moreover, Additional Protocol II, Article 3 (1), provides: “Nothing in this 
Protocol shall be invoked for the purpose of affecting the sovereignty of a state or the 
responsibility of the government, by all legitimate means, to maintain or re-establish law and 
order in the State or to defend the national unity and territorial integrity of the State.” See AP 
II, supra note 7, art. 3 (1). This section clearly indicates that a State can recognize the 
application of AP II to its internal armed conflict without making an implicit recognition of the 
sovereignty demands of dissident armed forces or an opposing organized armed group. Id. 
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combatants and civilians (i.e., what constitutes an organized armed 
group) and when a civilian can be considered to be engaged in “direct 
participation in hostilities.” This discussion leads directly to the 
question whether the LRA members can be held accountable for all 
offenses committed in violation of Ugandan law, or whether the GoU 
would voluntarily extend combatant’s privilege to the killing of 
UPDF soldiers and other government employees. 
The LRA conflict has spread over four Central African nations, 
each of which has different obligations under IHL. Uganda has been a 
state party to the Geneva Conventions since 1964 and ratified AP II in 
1991.54 This means that Common Article 3, as well as the additional 
protections under the AP II, have possible application to its internal 
conflict with the LRA.55 Sudan, the DRC, and the CAR are also state 
parties to the Geneva Conventions and APs I and II, but each with 
different accession/ratification dates.56 The critical point here is that 
Common Article 2 could be applicable to the Sudan, at least to the 
extent that Sudan used the LRA as a proxy in its fight against 
Uganda’s support to the Sudan People's Liberation Army (“SPLA”) 
and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (“SPLM”). 
The Rome Statute has incomplete reach over the range of 
offenses committed in this conflict. Uganda, Sudan, the DRC, and the 
CAR have all signed the Rome Statute, although Sudan later 
withdrew in 2008.57 In any case, the Rome Statute did not come into 
                                                                                                                                           
54. AP II, supra note 7. 
55. See id. AP II would not, however, be applicable to the first three or four years of the 
conflict involving the HSMF/emergent LRA, that is until the date that the protocol became 
effective against Uganda. See AP II, supra note 7. Many provisions of the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions, as well as parts of AP II, would be considered binding upon Uganda as 
customary international law. See id. 
56. Sudan’s accession to the Geneva Conventions was effective on March 23, 1985, but 
its accession to AP I was not effective until September 7, 2006 and its accession to AP II was 
not effective until January 13, 2007. See supra note 7. The DRC’s succession to the Geneva 
Conventions was effective on June 30, 1960 and its accession to both AP I and AP II were 
effective on January 13, 2007. Id. The CAR’s succession to the Geneva Conventions was 
effective on July 23, 1996, and its accessions to AP I and AP II were effective on January 17, 
2005. See United Nations Treaty Collection, https://treaties.un.org/Pages/Home.aspx (last 
visited Feb. 3, 2015). This means that Common Article 3 and AP II are both applicable to 
most, but not all periods and areas, of the Uganda-LRA conflict. 
57. Sudan signed the Rome Statute on September 8, 2000, but later withdrew on August 
26, 2008 with the following note to the UN Secretary General: “Sudan does not intend to 
become a party to the Rome Statute. Accordingly, Sudan has no legal obligation arising from 
its signature on 8 September 2000.” The DRC’s ratification occurred on May 3, 2004 and the 
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effect until July of 2002, making it inapplicable for the first fifteen 
years of the LRA’s existence. Critically, for the interests of justice 
and accountability, this means that many early war crimes committed 
by either the LRA and the UPDF (or potentially other parties) cannot 
be addressed through the ICC. While the LRA-Uganda conflict did 
range over part of what is now the independent Republic of South 
Sudan, Juba did not gain its independence from Sudan until July of 
2011, long after the LRA departed its territory.58 
B. The Nature of the Conflict 
One initial problem to seeking accountability involves the 
definition of a non-international armed conflict, and how this affects 
the legal obligations of the parties to that conflict.59 In effect, there are 
two types of non-international armed conflict in IHL. Common 
Article 3 applies to an “armed conflict not of an international 
character occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting 
Parties,” without further qualification. Yet, AP II applies to armed 
conflicts that “take place in the territory of a High Contracting Party 
between its armed forces and dissident armed forces or other 
organized armed groups which, under responsible command exercise 
such control over a part of its territory as to enable them to carry out 
sustained and concerted military operations and to implement this 
Protocol.”60 This leads to the issue whether the LRA qualifies as an 
“organized armed group”—with territorial control—triggering the 
application of AP II. In any case, Common Article 3 provides the 
minimum standards for humanitarian treatment applicable during 
armed conflict, with AP II imposing additional requirements on 
signatory countries and “organized armed groups” that exercise 
territorial control. 
The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 
(“ICTY”) has held that “armed conflict of a non-international 
character may only arise when there is protracted violence between 
                                                                                                                                           
CAR’s ratification occurred on October 3, 2001. See United Nations Treaty Collection, supra 
note 56. 
58 . South Sudan Country Profile, BBC NEWS AFRICA, http://www.bbc.co.uk/  
news/world-africa-14069082. 
59. See generally Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, How is the term “Armed Conflict” 
defined in international humanitarian law?, ICRC OPINION PAPER (Mar. 2008). 
60. AP II, supra note 7. 
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governmental authorities and organised armed groups, or between 
such groups, within a State.”61 In fact, the ICTY has elaborated on the 
intensity of the “protracted armed violence” required and has 
developed a robust list of factors that can be used in a totality of the 
circumstances test.62 Likewise, the ICTY has also elaborated on the 
second requirement involving a conflict with an “organized armed 
group.” 63  On one hand, the Ugandan government was faced with 
internal civil strife and “banditry,” meaning that the Uganda Penal 
Code applies in all parts of the country, whether or not IHL overlays 
on that or not, for certain situations. On the other hand, the fact that 
fighting took place only in certain parts of the country and not others 
does not necessarily preclude the application of the IHL provided that 
the criminal acts were sufficiently connected with the ongoing 
conflict. 
It is apparent that Uganda has been facing protracted armed 
violence by an organized armed group under “responsible command,” 
but one that never established any degree of territorial control. The 
group has functioned as Kony’s alter-ego and he has administered 
“discipline,” at least in the sense that he has executed persons who 
dissented from his decisions.64 He did establish a political wing with 
                                                                                                                                           
61. Prosecutor v. Haradinaj (Nov. 29, 2012) Case No. IT-04-84bis-T, Public Judgment 
with Confidential Annex,  para. 393 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia);  Prosecutor 
v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Decision on the Defense Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on 
Jurisdiction, ¶ 70 (Int’l Crim. Tribun. for the Former Yugoslavia, Oct. 2, 1995). 
62. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Milosevic (June 16, 2004) Case No. IT-02-54-T, Decision on 
Motion for Judgment of Acquittal, para. 27 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia). The 
Court considered the length or protracted nature of the conflict and seriousness and increase in 
armed clashes, the spread of clashes over territory, the increase in the number of government 
forces sent to the territory, and the weapons used by both parties. See also Prosecutor v. Limaj 
(Nov. 30, 1995) Case No. IT-03-66-T, Judgment, para. 90 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former 
Yugoslavia) (adding whether the conflict has come the attention of the UN Security Council 
and whether any resolutions have been passed on the matter). 
63. Prosecutor v. Haradinaj (Apr. 3, 2008) Case No. IT-04-84-T, Judgment, para. 49 
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia). The Court considered factors such as whether 
the group has a command structure with disciplinary rules; whether the group has a 
headquarters; whether the group controls territory; the ability of the group to gain access to 
weapons, other military equipment, recruits and military training; its ability to plan, 
coordinate, and carry out military operations, including troop movements and logistics; its 
ability to define a unified military strategy and use military tactics; and its ability to speak with 
one voice to negotiate and conclude agreements such as cease-fire or peace accords. 
64 . On October 2, 2007, Kony had his deputy Vincent Otti executed, likely for 
disagreeing with him on certain issues. Otti ‘Executed by Uganda Rebels,’ BBC NEWS AFRICA 
(Dec. 21, 2007), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7156284.stm. Moreover, the LRA has often 
imposed harsh discipline on new abductees, both as a means of transforming the person into a 
 
266 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 40:2 
an external spokesman, but this was likely a fiction created for 
propaganda purposes in that he has never offered any form of positive 
political program for the Acholi people. He established a command 
structure for his military wing, complete with military ranks, uniforms 
and unit structures. At least in the early years, the LRA received arms, 
supplies and sanctuary from Sudan, but whether and when that 
relationship ended is unclear. The LRA never controlled territory, 
except when in base camps in the DRC during the 2006 to 2008 
period during which time Kony conducted negotiations—likely not in 
good faith—with the Ugandan government. Kony did, however, 
operate with impunity over a large area of Uganda north of the 
Victoria Nile, forcing the UPDF to conduct large scale operations to 
track him down. It is this lack of territorial “control” in northern 
Uganda that may preclude the application of AP II to this conflict.65 
Nonetheless, the Uganda-LRA conflict has been of sufficient 
duration (over twenty-five years) and intensity (a considerable 
number of persons have been killed or displaced throughout the 
country), that one could reasonably conclude that the conflict is a 
“non-international armed conflict.” Typically, the LRA would raid a 
village, killing or kidnapping scores of innocent civilians, while the 
government was forced to respond with large scale military security 
and search operations. One fact here that should be dispositive is that 
the Ugandan government has felt obligated to respond to the armed 
conflict with the use of its regular armed forces; clearly, the Ugandan 
government believes that it has been facing much more than a law 
enforcement problem and is engaged in a fight with a belligerent 
group. 
The explicit language in Common Article 3 clearly refers to a 
conflict that occurs in the territory of one country and against its 
armed forces; it appears to exclude conflicts involving a State and an 
organized armed group in a neighboring State. Nonetheless, even 
though Uganda is no longer faced with an adversary in its territory, 
that fact should not change the characterization of the conflict. 
                                                                                                                                           
new member and as a means of preventing escape. Opiyo Oloya describes the process as 
Lwoko wii Cibilian (“Washing the Civilian Mind”). See OLOYA, supra note 11, at 82-90. 
65. There is evidence that the LRA did control some parts of Eastern Equatoria (southern 
Sudan) during the 1990s, but this could be best construed as the use of base camps for 
operations against either the SPLM/A as a proxy for Sudan or against the Acholi in northern 
Uganda. Schomerus, supra note 3, at 20-21. 
2017] THE QUEST FOR JUSTICE: KONY & THE LRA 267 
Uganda has continued its fight against the LRA, with permission from 
the DRC and the CAR, and—while the LRA has committed 
widespread atrocities against Congolese and Central African 
peoples—the LRA has not taken up arms against those other 
governments. The existence of state consent for UPDF operations 
means that an international armed conflict does not exist between 
Uganda and its neighbors; the lack of an LRA fight against either the 
DRC or the CAR means that a non-international armed conflict does 
not exist between the LRA and either the DRC or CAR. Instead, the 
DRC and the CAR face a serious threat from an “organized armed 
group,” originating in Uganda, which necessitates the use of military 
forces supported by intelligence and air assets that neither country 
has. Thus, the continued UPDF operations can be justified on a 
defense of others rationale; indeed, Uganda has a moral obligation to 
track down and destroy LRA elements committing continuing crimes 
against innocent civilians in neighboring countries. On the balance, 
Common Article 3 should apply to Uganda’s internal and external 
conflicts with the LRA. 
At least during the early years of the Uganda-LRA conflict, there 
is some evidence that Sudan provided the LRA with arms, equipment, 
and sanctuary, in part because Uganda was providing the same 
support to the SPLM/A.66 However, it is difficult to assess the nature 
and extent of the actual conflict between Sudan and Uganda during 
that period. Nonetheless, each government used its neighbor’s 
opposing non-state group to some extent as a proxy in the low-level 
conflict that existed between them. In turn, this raises a question 
whether Sudan used the LRA to conduct an “armed attack” against 
Uganda, thereby creating a bilateral, international armed conflict 
between Sudan and Uganda until the cessation of that reciprocal 
support. 
The 1986 decision of the ICJ in U.S. v. Nicaragua provides a 
useful analysis under the UN Charter for the difference between an 
illegal use of force and an “armed attack,”67 an important threshold in 
                                                                                                                                           
66. See Schomerus, supra note 3, at 24-28. 
67.  Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United 
States of America) 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27, 1986). Article 2 (4) of the UN Charter proscribes 
“the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any 
state,” but Article 51 recognizes the inherent right of self-defense if an “armed attack” occurs. 
Thus, if Uganda was not confronted with an “armed attack,” it did not have the right to 
respond with armed force against Sudan. This means that an “international armed conflict” 
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assessing the nature of the international armed conflict. In part, the 
court examined the level of support provided by Nicaragua to the 
proxy groups fighting in El Salvador, making a distinction between 
groups that acted independently and those that acted under the 
“effective” control of the state actor. The Nicaragua court found that 
Nicaragua’s arming and training of guerrillas constituted a “use of 
force” against El Salvador, but held that such actions did not arise to 
the level of an “armed attack” which would have justified self-defense 
actions under Article 51. 
The court’s characterization of Nicaragua’s activity as a “frontier 
incident,” that is hostile but localized military actions, suggests that 
limited support to proxy groups might fall short of the “armed attack” 
threshold. In fact, both the LRA in its fight against Uganda and the 
SPLM/A in its fight against Sudan remained largely independent 
actors, except for a possible period when the LRA operated from base 
camps in southern Sudan, but without ever ceding control to its state 
sponsors.68 In other words, unless Sudan ever took “control” over 
(helped organize, plan, or direct) LRA operations, the conflict in 
northern Uganda likely remained non-international.69 On one hand, 
Sudan would never admit to taking control of the group and would 
have every reason to hide evidence of its involvement with a 
notorious organization. On the other hand, Kony has long claimed 
political, military, and even moral status in representing Acholi 
interests; he would never acknowledge anything other than an 
independent political-military relationship with Sudan. 
                                                                                                                                           
may not have actually existed between the two nations, despite the feuding proxy groups 
supporting opposing sides. 
68. See also Antonio Cassese, The Nicaragua and Tadić Tests Revisited in Light of the 
ICJ Judgment on Genocide in Bosnia, 18 EUR. J. INT’L L. 4, 649-88 (2007) (explaining the 
differences between the “effective control” test in the Nicaragua decision and the broader 
“overall control” test in the Tadic decision). Cassese believes that the more stringent effective 
control test is appropriate where the issue is whether a state is responsible for the actions of 
individuals in violation of IHL, while the overall control test is more appropriate where the 
issue is state responsibility for organized armed groups or militia units. See id. at 657. 
69. The International Law Commission provides:  “The conduct of a person or group of 
persons shall be considered an act of a State under international law if the person or group of 
persons is in fact acting on the instructions of, or under the direction or control of, that State in 
carrying out the conduct.” INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION, DRAFT ARTICLES ON STATE 
RESPONSIBILITY (2001), art. 8, http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/
9_6_2001.pdf. 
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Arguably, Sudan may still be held accountable for breaches of 
IHL as a matter of state responsibility, even if the fight remained a 
non-international armed conflict. This, in turn, raises questions about 
the identity of any Sudanese officials who supported the LRA, the 
nature and extent of their support to the organization, and whether any 
of their acts could be imputed to Sudan. Indeed, while the bilateral 
conflict between the two nations ostensibly ended with the 1999 
Nairobi Agreement, there have been periodic allegations (likely 
unprovable) that some officials continued that support relationship for 
an indeterminate period thereafter. 
The Uganda-LRA conflict, at least through 2006 when the LRA 
moved to new base camps in the DRC, is probably best characterized 
as a non-international armed conflict within the meaning of Common 
Article 3 but excluding AP II, despite the LRA’s capability to range 
over broad territory.70 First, absent compelling evidence of control by 
Sudan or other outside state actors, the conflict has involved an 
“organized armed group” that waged an insurgency/terror campaign 
against Uganda. Indeed, it is only during the 1998-2003 conflict 
between Uganda and the DRC that the conflict could have included 
an “international armed conflict” component.71 Second, the LRA has 
                                                                                                                                           
70 . See generally Marco Sassoli, Transnational Armed Groups and International 
Humanitarian Law, HARV. U. PROGRAM ON HUMANITARIAN POL’Y & CONFLICT RES. (2006) 
(examining whether and how the existing rules of IHL should be adapted to address problems 
raised by the extraterritorial character of the fight against transnational armed groups). One 
consequence of this determination that the conflict is non-international is that neither Kony nor 
members of the UPDF can be held criminally liable for “grave breaches” against civilians in 
violation of Geneva Convention IV, supra note 6, Articles 146-47. See also CORN ET AL, 
supra note 49, at 475-83 and 496-98 (citing Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1, Decision 
on Defense Motion on Jurisdiction (Aug. 10, 1995), and Prosecutor v. Delalic et al., Celebici: 
Case No. IT-96-21-T (Nov. 16, 1998)). Both the Tadic and the Celebici cases suggest an 
erosion of the distinctions between international and non-international armed conflict, 
especially as it relates to serious war crimes. Nonetheless, the analytic distinction remains and 
the “extradite or prosecute” obligation under Article 146 would probably not apply even 
though serious violations of the Common Article 3 are still arguably war crimes subject to 
universal jurisdiction. 
71. The conflict did take on some early overtones of a transnational armed conflict with 
offenses against the international community. For example, the LRA is probably responsible 
for attacks on MONUC peacekeepers, to include a 2006 attack near Garamba National Park 
that left eight dead. Armed Group Kills 8 UN Peacekeepers in Garamba Park, IRIN NEWS 
(Jan. 23 2006,) http://www.irinnews.org/report/57888/drc-armed-group-kills-8-un-
peacekeepers-in-garamba-park. Such attacks, if made after July 2002, would be a war crime 
under the Rome Statute. See Rome Statute, supra note 14. Article 8 (2)(b)(iii) provides that it 
is a war crime to attack peacekeepers “as long as they are entitled to the protection given to 
civilian or civilian objects under the international law of armed conflict.” 
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never controlled territory, except in the sense that it directed activities 
over a specific geographic area, making it difficult to argue for the 
application of AP II to this conflict. Third, the LRA’s move to new 
base camps is legally significant because the LRA ceased operations 
in northern Uganda and entered peace negotiations with the GoU that 
lasted through November of 2008. Peace and security returned to 
northern Uganda for the first time in twenty years; this means that the 
non-international conflict between the LRA and the GoU likely 
ended, at least during that time. 
The de facto peace between the LRA and GoU was short-lived, 
raising a question about how to characterize the conflict after 
December of 2008. By late 2008 the GoU had apparently concluded 
that Kony was not negotiating in good faith and that the threat posed 
by his group had to be eliminated through resumed combat 
operations. The December 2008 UPDF attack on the LRA base camps 
caused the group to initiate a new terror campaign, largely in a fight 
for its existence as it sought food and supplies while trying to escape 
pursuing Ugandan forces by fleeing west and away from Uganda. It is 
this new terror campaign that has resulted in widespread attacks on 
defenseless Congolese and Central African peoples, and has brought 
further US and international support to the Ugandan fight. Arguably, 
the post-2008 combat operations against the LRA are not a 
resumption of the earlier non-international armed conflict, but 
represent self-defense actions, or counter-terrorism operations, by 
affected regional governments against an imminent threat from an 
organized armed group. 
C. The Combatant Status of LRA Members 
The LRA poses vexing problems in terms of the combatant 
status of its members under the Third Geneva Convention. Initially, 
there is the question whether the organization itself transitioned from 
a criminal enterprise, subject solely to Ugandan criminal laws, to 
belligerent status under IHL, or has become some combination of 
both criminal and belligerent. This poses important political and legal 
issues for Uganda. In turn, this leads to the issue whether the LRA 
members are combatants who can be targeted based on status and 
later subjected to prosecution upon capture. Finally, the combatant 
status of LRA members raises two additional complications, one 
involving child soldiers and one involving kidnapped persons. Can 
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children be targeted as combatants and then later prosecuted for 
criminal offenses? 
There is a significant question about the status of kidnapped 
persons, primarily children, who were subsequently forced to become 
either soldiers (the young boys) in the organization or wives (the 
young girls) to LRA soldiers. 72  Treaty-based and customary 
international law73 generally proscribes the recruitment of children 
under the age of fifteen into the armed forces, as well as their 
participation in hostilities. Indeed, the LRA has not been known to 
take voluntary recruits in over twenty years; the kidnapping of 
children, some as young as eight, has been the preferred “recruiting 
practice.” 74  In a typical attack on a village, the LRA members 
rounded up families, young and old, and often forced children to kill 
their own parents, likely as a psychological means of severing the 
                                                                                                                                           
72. Arguably, many LRA members, to include even former senior officers such as ICC 
defendant Dominic Ongwen who was abducted at age ten, and who grew to consider people 
like Vincent Otti as father figures, are victims as much as they are combatants responsible for 
war crimes. Ledio Cakaj, The Complex Story of a Child Soldier, WASH. POST, (Jan. 12, 2015), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2015/01/12/the-complex-story-of-a-
child-soldier/. 
73. Under the 1977 Additional Protocol I, applicable to international armed conflict and 
no doubt reflecting customary international law, children may not be recruited or take part in 
hostilities. Article 77 (3) provides that if, “despite the provisions of paragraph 2, children who 
have not attained the age of fifteen years take a direct part in hostilities and fall into the power 
of an adverse Party, they shall continue to benefit from the special protection accorded by this 
Article, whether or not they are prisoners of war.” The 1989 Convention on the Rights of the 
Child, Article 38, ratified by Uganda on August 17, 1990, extends legal rights and protections 
to children accused of crimes. The 2000 Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of 
the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict, Article 4, provides that: “1. Armed 
groups that are distinct from the armed forces of a State should not, under any circumstances, 
recruit or use in hostilities persons under the age of 18 years. 2. States Parties shall take all 
feasible measures to prevent such recruitment and use, including the adoption of legal 
measures necessary to prohibit and criminalize such practices [emphasis added].” Uganda 
acceded to the protocol on May 6, 2002. See also The African Charter on the Rights and 
Welfare of the Child, which was ratified by Uganda on August 17, 1994 and entered into force 
on November 29, 1999; Article 22 proscribes the recruiting of child soldiers and their direct 
participation in hostilities. See generally Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, Customary 
International Humanitarian Law, supra note 25, Rules 136, 137. Rule 137 provides a useful 
analysis of customary international law regarding the status of children while participating in 
hostilities. 
74 . See Christian Boatswain, Uganda: Child Soldiers at Centre of Mounting 
Humanitarian Crisis, U.N. NEWS CENTRE, http://www.un.org/events/tenstories/06/story.asp? 
storyID=100 (last visited Feb. 19, 2015). Amnesty International estimates that eighty percent 
of the LRA combatants are kidnapped children. Kevin C. Dunn, Killing for Christ? The Lord’s 
Resistance Army of Uganda, 103 CURRENT HISTORY 206 (2004). 
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connections with home and as a means of “bonding” new recruits to 
the organization. Moreover, any children who subsequently attempted 
escape were harshly disciplined. Nonetheless, at some point, many 
such children have become willing members of the organization, 
either as “soldiers” or in an active “combat support” role. In short, at 
what point are kidnapped children no longer afforded status as 
protected persons and become “combatants” who can be held 
accountable for the capital, or other crimes?75 
The International Committee of the Red Cross (“ICRC”) uses a 
“combat function” test to assess whether someone can be targeted. 
According to the ICRC, in “non-international armed conflict, 
organized armed groups constitute the armed forces of a non-State 
party to the conflict and consist only of individuals whose continuous 
function it is to take a direct part in hostilities (‘continuous combat 
function’).”76 The ICRC sees the CCF test as involving a person’s 
integration into combat operations, to include the “preparation, 
execution, or command of acts or operations amounting to direct 
participation in hostilities,” 77  but excluding other persons who 
accompany or support the group. Here, a combat function could 
include carrying arms, exercising command over the group (or a sub-
unit), or carrying out various operational planning, intelligence, or 
logistical (e.g., delivering ammunition) activities. Thus, the CCF test 
makes it possible for the UPDF to target LRA “family” members, to 
include either children or “wives,” depending upon the circumstances. 
In other words, family members may support the group in many 
different ways, including spontaneous, episodic participation in 
hostilities, followed by a return to domestic activities. Nonetheless, 
family members cannot be regarded as members of an organized 
armed group unless they assume a “continuous combat function.” 
                                                                                                                                           
75. Geneva Convention IV, supra note 6, art. 68 (4) provides that “the death penalty may 
not be pronounced against a protected person who was under eighteen years of age at the time 
of the offense.” AP II, supra note 7, art. 6 (4) also prohibits the imposition of the death penalty 
on children under age eighteen at the time of the offense. 
76 . Nels Melzer, Interpretive Guidance on The Notion of Direct Participation in 
Hostilities Under International Humanitarian Law, International Committee of the Red Cross 
16 (Feb. 2009). See also HJC 769/02 Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. Gov’t of 
Israel (1999) (Isr.) (construing the application of customary international law to Israeli 
targeting practices against non-state actors, to include reviewing the standards for direct 
participation in hostilities and imposing a “heavy” burden of proof on the attacking army). 
77. Melzer, supra note 76, at 34. 
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Kony and the military members of his organization probably 
qualify as unprivileged “belligerents” within the meaning of the Third 
Geneva Convention.78 Article 4(a)(2) provides persuasive guidance 
for assessing the combatant status for members of “militias and 
members of other volunteer corps, including those of organized 
resistance movements.” 79  Here, Kony has firmly asserted his 
command over the LRA, 80  enforcing adherence to his own 
idiosyncratic code of conduct, while his men have worn uniforms and 
carried weapons openly, but while also consistently and openly 
flouting the laws and customs of war.81 Indeed, Kony went to great 
lengths for many years to showcase his organization as a “military 
organization,” complete with ranks and unit structures.82 This means 
that the UPDF can conduct status-based targeting of the LRA 
consistent with the principle of distinction.83 Thus, a uniformed LRA 
                                                                                                                                           
78. Geneva Convention III, supra note 5, art. 4(a)(2). While this standard is applicable to 
international armed conflict, it does provide a useful reference for assessing the combatant 
status for targeting the members of an “organized armed group” in non-international armed 
conflict. The fact that the UPDF may make status-based targeting decisions does not 
necessarily mean that the LRA members also have other combatant rights, such as immunity 
from prosecution for killing members of the UPDF. 
79. Id. The members of a militia, volunteer corps, or organized resistance movement 
must be “commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates,” have “a fixed distinctive 
sign recognizable at a distance,” carry arms openly, and conduct “their operations in 
accordance with laws and customs of war.” 
80. Evolution of LRA Command Structure, LRA CRISIS TRACKER (2016) (last visited 
Feb. 18, 2015) (on file with author). 
81. Kony has repeatedly demonstrated his capacity to enforce IHL, if he would choose to 
do so. As an example, in 2007 Kony executed his deputy Vincent Otti, apparently as a 
disciplinary measure. BBC NEWS AFRICA, supra note 64. Moreover, the LRA leaders have 
been known to beat, torture, and kill recently abducted child to establish discipline and exact 
compliance with orders. See OLOYA, supra note 11. 
82. Under the 2005 UPDF Act, it is illegal for non-members of the armed forces to carry 
arms or wear military uniforms in Uganda. Section 119 (1)(h)(i) gives the military courts 
jurisdiction over civilians who have illegal possession of “arms, ammunition or equipment 
being the monopoly of the Defence Forces. . . .” Section 164 (1)(a) prohibits any person, 
without authority, from wearing or using “any uniform supplied, to or authorized for use by, 
any member of the Defence Forces.” A violation of this latter provision can result in an 
imprisonment term, not exceeding seven years. This is a point that is periodically raised in 
Ugandan press articles. See, e.g., Pat Robert Larubi, UPDF Warns Again on Use of Military 
Attire,” CHIMPREPORTS (Jan. 5, 2015), http://chimpreports.com/updf-warns-again-on-use-of-
military-attire. In short, there is unequivocal evidence that Kony claims combatant status for 
members of his organization. This also means that Kony and his soldiers can be prosecuted by 
general court martial for arms and uniform violations of the UPDF Act. 
83. Geneva Convention Common Article 3 (1) provides that “[p]ersons taking no active 
part in the hostilities” shall be treated humanely, but the phrasing in AP II is slightly different, 
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member—with clear membership in the group—raises a presumption 
of hostility and provides the UPDF with the authority to conduct 
status-based targeting against such a person. The situation becomes 
problematic if the LRA members are not wearing uniforms, or are 
family members serving in a range of combat support roles. In any 
case, as unprivileged belligerents, Kony and his followers may not 
claim “prisoner of war” status and may be held accountable for all 
offenses under Ugandan law, as well as for any war crimes committed 
in violation of IHL.84 
In sum, the Uganda-LRA conflict also raises important questions 
about the status of LRA members, a point that concerns both targeting 
as well as the scope of “combatant immunity” under IHL. The UPDF 
must conduct operations consistent with the basic principles of 
necessity, distinction, proportionality and humanity. 85  Here, the 
UPDF has a clear need to eliminate an armed group that poses a wide-
ranging threat to civilians and military personnel, and it must do so 
while limiting incidental injury to civilians (namely, persons not 
taking part in hostilities) and avoiding or minimizing collateral 
damage in accordance with the principle of proportionality. While, in 
some cases, the UPDF can target LRA members based upon 
combatant status in the organization, in other cases it is limited to the 
standard involving direct participation in hostilities. Nonetheless, 
captured LRA members are not entitled to claim prisoner of war 
status with resulting combatant immunity. 
                                                                                                                                           
directing that the civilian population “shall not be the object of attack” and that [c]ivilians shall 
enjoy the protection of the afforded by this part, unless and for such time as they take a direct 
part in hostilities.” AP II, supra note 7, art. 13 (3). According to the ICRC, “Acts amounting to 
direct participation in hostilities must meet three cumulative requirements: (1) a threshold 
regarding the harm likely to result from the act, (2) a relationship of direct causation between 
the act and the expected harm, and (3) a belligerent nexus between the act and the hostilities 
conducted between the parties to an armed conflict.” Melzer, supra note 76, at 46. 
84. The right to prisoner of war status is controlled by Geneva Convention III, Article 4, 
but that article is inapplicable to non-international armed conflict. Prisoners of war are 
generally entitled to “combatant immunity,” that is immunity from prosecution for lawful 
killings (e.g., UPDF soldiers and other government employees). 
85. Melzer, supra note 76, at 77. The general principles regarding the protection of 
civilians likely reflect customary international law. See generally Melzer, supra note 76; 
Michael Matheson, Deputy Legal Advisor, U.S. Dep’t of State, Remarks at Sixth Annual 
American Red Cross-Washington College of the Law Workshop (Jan. 27, 1987).  
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D. Assessment: The Scope of Combatant’s Privilege 
The characterization of the conflict as non-international, as well 
as a finding that the LRA members are “unprivileged belligerents,” 
has important implications for accountability under both domestic and 
international criminal law. On one hand, if a non-international armed 
conflict has existed, Uganda can treat Kony and his followers as part 
of a criminal organization subject to prosecution under Ugandan 
criminal laws for the full range of acts, whether committed against the 
UPDF or civilians. Moreover, even if Common Article 3 does apply 
to this conflict, Uganda can still choose—as a policy matter—to 
prosecute LRA members for the killing of soldiers and civilians alike, 
or it can choose to exercise prosecutorial discretion and to exclusively 
charge war crimes (effectively extending “combatant’s privilege” to 
LRA members). On the other hand, if an international armed conflict 
has existed, Uganda may decide to forego prosecution for certain acts 
against the government while prosecuting Kony and his followers for 
war crimes and crimes against humanity. Also, a finding that certain 
offenses were committed in a non-international armed conflict limits 
the permissible range of charges against LRA members (i.e., Kony 
cannot be held accountable for “grave breaches” per se). In any case, 
Uganda must make a policy decision on whether, as well as for what 
crimes, to prosecute previously abducted children. This leads directly 
to the question of how Kony and his followers could be prosecuted 
under Ugandan law; this is a topic that has been seldom discussed in 
scholarly literature. 
IV. ACCOUNTABILITY UNDER UGANDAN LAW 
A. Introduction: Modernizing Ugandan Law and Practice 
In theory, LRA members can be prosecuted for a range of crimes 
under existing national law, eliminating the need for an international 
court to adjudicate cases—at least to the extent that municipal courts 
are willing and able to do so. Uganda, since its 1962 independence 
from Great Britain, has experienced political instability, with periods 
of civil unrest and serious human rights violations.86 Nonetheless, the 
                                                                                                                                           
86. Francis M. Ssekandi & Cos Gitta, Protection of Fundamental Rights in the Uganda 
Constitution, 26 COL. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1919 (1994). 
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1995 Constitution, the third since independence, provides for an 
independent judiciary with significant powers. While the 
administration of justice in Uganda has evolved in many positive 
respects over the past 20 years, Ugandan law—constitutional, 
statutory, and decisional—has shortcomings in certain areas and the 
courts lack experience in complex criminal and war crimes cases. 
This suggests that, despite great efforts to modernize Ugandan law 
and practice, its courts would face important challenges in 
adjudicating complex, high profile cases in a fair and consistent 
manner that would be respected by disinterested and affected persons 
alike. In short, the LRA offenses are not garden-variety criminal 
cases, but involve a wide range of acts over a broad period of time 
with complex legal and evidentiary issues that the Ugandan judiciary 
has rarely, if ever, faced. 
B. The Administration of Justice: Courts, Statutes, & Issues 
Uganda was a British protectorate from 1892 until its 
independence on October 9, 1962. Subsequently, the country passed 
through several periods of military rule (the Idi Amin, Tito Okello, 
and Museveni regimes) and marked human rights abuses. Eventually, 
in 1987 Yoweri Museveni seized power and established a new 
government. The 1995 Constitution provides for the overall structure 
of the government and outlines a series of rights and freedoms.87 The 
Constitution creates a legislature (the Parliament), an Executive (the 
President), a Cabinet that includes the Attorney General88 and the 
Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP), 89  and the judiciary. On 
national security matters, the Constitution creates the UPDF,90 the 
Uganda Police,91 and the intelligence services.92 
                                                                                                                                           
87. See CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA (Uganda), (Sept. 22, 1995), arts. 
20-45, available at http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b5ba0.html. The Constitution provides 
for a range of human rights including freedom from discrimination, right to life, protection of 
personal liberty, respect for human dignity, and protection from inhuman treatment, privacy, 
right to a fair hearing, the protection of minorities, and the right to access information. 
88 . Id. art. 119. The Attorney General serves as the principal legal adviser of the 
government, including representation of the government in court. 
89. Id. art. 120. The DPP directs police investigations and criminal prosecutions. 
90 . Id. arts. 208-10. Under Article 210 (b), Parliament has the power over the 
“recruitment, appointment, promotion, discipline and removal of members of the Uganda 
Peoples’ Defence Forces and ensuring that members of the Uganda Peoples’ Defence Forces 
are recruiting from every district of Uganda.” No doubt, this latter provision was enacted to 
overcome the earlier British practice of recruiting soldiers largely from the northern districts to 
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The Ugandan judiciary is based upon the legacy of British rule; 
the English legal system, to include a hierarchy of courts that 
adjudicate cases based upon statute, and English common law, to 
include its customs and practices, has left an enduring imprint on the 
Ugandan judiciary that continues to the present day. The 1995 
Constitution provides for courts of judicature to include a Supreme 
Court of Uganda, the Court of Appeal of Uganda, the High Court of 
Uganda, and such subordinate courts as may be established by 
Parliament. 93  In turn, Parliament has passed statutes that are 
applicable to a wide range of national security issues and the judiciary 
has decided a small body of relevant cases. Nonetheless, Uganda has 
nascent structure, processes, and procedures, as well as judicial 
experience, for addressing the complex issues in national security 
cases. 
 Uganda has several important statutes that are applicable to the 
range of offenses that occurred over the course of the entire conflict 
with the LRA, to include acts committed by either military personnel 
or civilians. The basic criminal law is the Penal Code Act of 1950. 
Article 4(2) provides for extra-territorial jurisdiction over Ugandan 
citizens who commit certain crimes abroad, to include treason, which 
includes levying war against Uganda (Article 23); offenses against the 
President (Article 24); concealment of treason (Article 25); terrorism 
(Article 26); and promoting war (Article 27), with a five year statute 
of limitations for offenses under Articles 23, 24, 25, and 26.94 The 
Penal Code Act has articles on treason and terrorism that sweep 
broadly and are subject to abuse. A person can commit treason in 
different ways; some sub-sections require an overt act and other sub-
sections can be violated by forming “an intention.” A person can 
violate the terrorism article largely through political acts that support 
                                                                                                                                           
ensure a “national” army. Parliament, in turn, has passed two statutes regulating the UPDF: the 
UPDF Act 1992 and the UPDF Act 2005. Both UPDF Acts address military justice matters, to 
include court martial authorities, structures, individual rights, and procedures. While the 2005 
Act is more detailed and provides better coverage of the issues, there are still due process 
concerns with the statute that include overbroad and vague articles, the lack of a right to 
defense counsel in trial proceedings, the application of the statute to persons not belonging to 
the UPDF or “accompanying the force,” and the application of the death penalty. 
91. Id. arts. 211-14. 
92. Id. art. 218. 
93. Id. art. 129. 
94. See The Penal Code Act, supra note 8. 
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the organization, though this has been superseded by the Anti-
Terrorism Act of 2002.95 
Kony and the senior leaders of the LRA could be charged with a 
broad range of criminal offenses under Ugandan law to include 
treason in that they have levied war against the nation, plotted and 
acted to overturn the government, and aided and abetted others in 
doing so in violation of the Penal Code Act.96 Additionally, Kony and 
his senior leaders have clearly been members of a terrorist 
organization, as defined under Ugandan law, and have committed a 
range of firearms offenses under Article 26(4). 
In 1964 Uganda passed The Geneva Conventions Act, which 
essentially “domesticated” the 1949 Geneva Conventions treaties.97 
The Act provides that any “person, whatever his or her nationality, 
who commits or aids, abets or procures the commission by any other 
person of any grave breach,” as defined in Geneva Conventions I 
through IV, commits an offense and is liable to punishment for up to 
life imprisonment.98 It is also noteworthy that the Act provides for 
extra-territorial (long arm) jurisdiction where “an offense under this 
section is committed without Uganda, a person may be proceeded 
against, indicted, tried and punished for that offense in any place in 
Uganda as if the offense had been committed in that place . . . .”99 
While Uganda is also a signatory to the Genocide Convention,100 this 
treaty has not been domesticated into Ugandan law.101 Contrary to 
emerging international practice, Uganda does still impose the death 
penalty for a range of offenses.102 
                                                                                                                                           
95. The Anti-Terrorism Act (2002) (Uganda). 
96. See The Penal Code Act, supra note 8, art. 23. 
97. See generally The Geneva Conventions Act (1964) (Uganda). 
98. Id. art. 2. 
99. Id. 
100. See The Genocide Convention, supra note 21. 
101. Report of the Committee on Defense and Internal Affairs on the Petition on the 
Lapsing of Part II of The Amnesty Act, 2000, The Republic of Uganda (Parliament), 27 
(August 2013). 
102. See The Penal Code Act, supra note 8. Uganda’s application of the death penalty 
has been roundly criticized over the past ten to fifteen years, in part because it had been 
automatically applied to a wide range of criminal offenses and in part because it is inconsistent 
with emerging international norms. For example, in 2005, the Constitutional Court ruled that 
its mandatory imposition was unconstitutional because it did not allow a trial to consider any 
mitigating circumstances that might make the death penalty an unduly severe punishment and 
did not allow a trial court any discretion in determining an appropriate sentence. Dr. Kizza 
Besigye & Others v. Attorney General (2010) UGCC 6 (Const. Petition No. 07 of 2007). 
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The UPDF, as indicated, is governed under a separate statutory 
basis.103 While either the 1992 or the 2005 UPDF Act could be readily 
applied to a wide range of war crimes committed by soldiers, there 
are also limited provisions that be readily applied to Kony, his senior 
officers and other members of the LRA. In any case, there are 
important questions about the competence, independence, and 
impartiality of Uganda’s military justice system.104 Both the 1992 and 
the current 2005 UPDF Act fail to provide adequate structure and 
processes for a fair trial, as applied to either military members or 
civilians. 
The 1992 UPDF Act proscribed a range of offenses and created 
a military justice system that is independent of the Ugandan 
judiciary. 105  Article 15 provides for jurisdiction over military 
members and certain non-members who accompany the forces or are 
commanded by members of the UPDF. It is noteworthy that certain 
civilians are also subject to military law under Article 15(i): “every 
person found in unlawful possession of arms, ammunition, equipment 
and other prescribed classified stores ordinarily being the monopoly 
of the army.”106 This article has been widely applied to militant/rebel 
                                                                                                                                           
103. CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA, supra note 87. See also Ronald 
Naluwairo, Military Justice, Human Rights and the Law: An Appraisal of the Right to a Fair 
Trial in Uganda’s Military Justice System (Nov. 2011) (unpublished doctor of philosophy 
thesis, University of London). This thesis is an excellent study of Uganda’s military justice 
system, tracing it from its historical roots to the present day, while providing a useful analysis 
of important issues that impact the defendant’s right to a fair trial. 
104. The government has, for example, claimed that it has court-martialed soldiers in the 
documented rape cases brought by civilians over the course of the Uganda-LRA conflict. See 
Wegner, supra note 21. But, even if one assumes that the UPDF may be able to conduct fair 
trials for soldiers accused of war crimes and other serious violations of international 
humanitarian law, this still leaves open the question of whether it would be “willing” to do so 
in a fair and public trial. 
105. UPDF Act (1992) (Uganda). One issue that has been periodically raised involves 
the surprising argument that the Constitution does not even apply to the UPDF. According to 
one jurist: “In the course of my eleven years service as a justice of the Constitutional Court, I 
have heard very senior representatives of the Attorney General argue that the Constitution does 
not apply to the Uganda Peoples Defence Force as it applies to other authorities and persons in 
Uganda. They particularly like to argue that the Constitution does not apply to the military 
courts martial because the Courts are not Courts of Judicature within the meaning of article 
129 of the Constitution.” See also Uganda Law Society & Anor v. Attorney General (2009) 
UGCC 1 (Constitutional Petitions No.2 & 8 of 2002). The Constitutional Court did hold that 
courts martial were part of Uganda’s system of justice and were subordinate to Article 128 
(Independence of the judiciary) of the Uganda Constitution.  
106. UPDF Act (1992), art. 15(i). Naluwairo explains that this expansion of military 
jurisdiction to civilians actually originated in 1973 by presidential decree from President Idi 
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groups throughout the country and has been the subject of much 
criticism.107 The 1992 UPDF Act further created a system of military 
courts to include field court-martial,108 division court-martial,109 and 
general court-martial.110  Of note, the statute also created a Court-
Martial Appeal Court, but it only has jurisdiction from the decisions 
of a general court-martial; the statute did not provide for any other 
appellate rights or procedures.111 The statute makes no mention of 
                                                                                                                                           
Amin, a dubious genesis for the modern UPDF Act. See also Naluwairo, supra note 103, at 
119. See Ronald Naluwairo, The Trial of Civilians in Uganda’s Military Courts: Interrogating 
the Reasons and Constitutionality, 19 E. AFRICAN J. OF PEACE & HUM. RTS. 383, 385 (2013) 
(examining some of the arguments that have been proffered as justification for military 
jurisdiction over civilians). 
107. See Righting Military Injustice Addressing Uganda’s Unlawful Prosecutions of 
Civilians in Military Courts, HUM. RTS. WATCH (July 27, 2011), https://www.hrw. 
org/report/2011/07/27/righting-military-injustice/addressing-ugandas-unlawful-prosecutions-
civilians (explaining that military courts have prosecuted over 1,000 civilians during the period 
2002-2011 for criminal offenses such as murder and armed robbery). See also John Emerson, 
“Get the Gun”: Human Rights Violations by Uganda’s National Army in Law Enforcement 
Operations in Karamoja Region, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Sept. 11, 2007), 
https://www.hrw.org/report/2007/09/11/get-gun/human-rights-violations-ugandas-national-
army-law-enforcement-operations; Naluwairo, supra note 103, at 176-83 (providing a detailed 
analysis under international human rights law that pointed out that allowing military courts to 
exercise jurisdiction over civilians raises issues regarding differential treatment under two 
different justice systems). 
108. UPDF Act (1992), art. 78. This provision has been the subject of much criticism. In 
2002, two Ugandan soldiers were tried by field court martial in Karamajo for a murder and 
robbery that occurred only three days before, and, after a trial of less than three hours and 
without an opportunity for any appeal, the soldiers were executed by firing squad. This has led 
at least one commentator to question the due process protections (e.g., right to counsel, quality 
of the pre-trial investigation, and appeal rights) available to UPDF soldiers. Indeed, there is 
even a strong implication that senior officers had decided upon execution even before the trial 
began. Henry Onoria, Soldiering and Constitutional Rights in Uganda: The Kotido Military 
Executions, 9 E. AFRICAN J. OF PEACE & HUM. RTS. 87, 101 (2003). In addition, there are also 
important questions about the jurisdiction of a field court martial, in that field commanders 
may have unfettered discretion in whether to convene such a tribunal with the power to impose 
capital punishment, but leaving a defendant with very limited rights. Naluwairo, supra note 
103, at 163-65. 
109. UPDF Act (1992), art. 80. 
110. Id. art. 81. 
111. Id. arts. 84-87. The Court Martial Court of Appeal was originally constituted in the 
1964 Armed Forces Act, but later became non-functional during the Idi Amin regime and 
thereafter. The Court was abolished with the 1986 NRA Codes of Code (Legal Notice No. 1), 
but was reconstituted with the UPDF Act 1992. Naluwairo, supra note 103, at 116-22. The 
UPDF Act 2005 provides that three of the five members of that Court, to include the 
Chairperson, shall be qualified advocates while the other two must be senior officers in the 
UPDF, but the statute makes no reference to their manner of appointment or tenure in office. 
There is no provision for the reporting of its decisions or the appeals process from that Court. 
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rules of procedure or evidence, the rights of an accused to retain 
counsel, court-martial transcripts/reports, or issues of command 
influence.112 Needless to say, the 1992 Act left open many questions 
about the due process rights of service members, as well as of citizens 
accused of weapons offenses. 
The 2005 UPDF Act is a substantial improvement on its 
predecessor, even though from a human rights perspective it contains 
some important gaps, as well as vague language subject to abuse.113 In 
addition, there are important issues concerning the competence, 
independence and impartiality of the proceedings, raising concerns 
whether the accused will receive a fair hearing and have appellate 
rights. 114  In one improvement over the 1992 Act, the military is 
enjoined to observe the rules of evidence and procedure applicable in 
civilian courts. Article 41 provides that accused soldiers deployed 
abroad will be repatriated to Uganda for trial or, if the soldier must be 
tried outside Uganda, that Ugandan law will apply. 115  There are, 
however, Articles that risk a confusion of military and civilian law 
enforcement roles; this leads to questions whether the Ugandan Police 
or the UPDF should be responding to a situation, the appropriate use 
of force, and whether certain offenses should be prosecuted through 
civilian or military courts. For example, Articles 42 through 45 
                                                                                                                                           
This raises substantial questions about the independence, transparency, and impartiality of the 
Court. Id. art. 199. 
112. The Court Martial Appeal Court is managed by its own regulations. As Naluwairo 
points out, this means that many aspects of courts processes and procedures can be changed at 
any time by the Defence Minister without parliamentary involvement. Naluwairo, supra note 
103, at 166-68. 
113. UPDF Act (2005). 
114 . See also Ronald Naluwairo, Uganda’s Military Courts and the Right to a 
Competent Tribunal: Some Reflections, 5 MALAWI L. J. 161 (2011) (arguing that there are no 
safeguards to ensure that Uganda’s military courts are competent and that appointed judicial 
officers have integrity); Ronald Naluwairo, Military Courts and Human Rights: A Critical 
Analysis of the Compliance of Uganda’s Military Justice with the Right to an Independent and 
Impartial Tribunal, 12 AFRICAN HUM. RTS. L. J. 448 (2012) (arguing that Uganda’s military 
courts lack independence and that appointed judge advocate officers lack tenure and financial 
security); Ronald Naluwairo, Uganda’s Civil Courts and the Administration of Military 
Justice: An Appraisal of their Jurisprudence on Selected Issues, 17 LAW, DEMOCRACY & 
DEVELOPMENT 111 (2013) (providing an overview of Ugandan military law and analyzes key 
cases involving senior army officers); see generally Ronald Naluwairo, The Trials and 
Tribulations of Rtd. Col. Dr. Kizza Besigye and 22 Others (Makerere University, Human 
Rights & Peace Centre, Working Paper, 2006) (examining the general court martial provisions 
in the 2005 UPDF Act and the trial of Col. Besigye). 
115. UPDF Act (2005), art. 4. 
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address UPDF aid to civil power, for example in response to riots or 
civil disturbances, and gives “officers and militants called out for 
service . . . all the powers and duties of a police officer.”116 Article 
119 (i), creating military jurisdiction over civilians charged with arms 
violations, is essentially the same wording as in the 1995 UPDF 
Act.117 
Articles 120 through 184 proscribe a range of offenses. Many 
offenses use vague/ambiguous language and/or carry harsh sentences, 
particularly when one considers the lack of publicly available court-
martial records and reports that could be used to guide future lawyers 
and researchers. In one example, under Article 122, a person “who 
fails to protect war materials [e.g., arms and ammunition], misuses or 
sells them, commits an offense and is on conviction, liable to suffer 
death.”118 In a second example, under Article 123, a person who: 
(a) is charged with the responsibility of briefing for an 
operation and fails to do so; 
(b) fails to obey instructions as explained or laid down 
regarding a briefing for an operation; or 
(c) fails to prepare for an operation, 
commits an offense and is, on conviction, where there is failure 
of operation or loss of life, liable to suffer death or, in any other 
case, liable to life imprisonment.119 
Clearly, both Articles 122 and 123 could result in heavy punishment 
where the accused acted negligently or was not the proximate cause 
of the operational failure. 
Articles 191 through 249 describe the operation of the military 
justice system to include the duties and functions of courts martial, 
presence of military advocates at various levels, and appellate rights 
                                                                                                                                           
116. Id. art. 43 (1). The UPDF routinely deploys units to Karamojong communities in 
support of civil authorities, raising a question regarding the applicability of the Geneva 
Conventions (a non-international armed conflict) or national law (domestic disturbances). This 
creates a critical issue as it applies to arms offenses under Article 119(i) of the UPDF Act. 
117. Id. art. 119(i). This article, like its predecessor in the 1995 Act, has been the subject 
of continuing criticism. Umaru Kashaka, MP calls for reforms in military court martial, NEW 
VISION (July 15, 2014), http://www.newvision.co.ug/news/ 657544-mps-calls-for-reforms-in-
military-court-martial.html. 
118. UPDF Act (2005), art. 122. 
119. UPDF Act (2005), art. 123. 
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and limitations.120 In general terms, this is a substantial improvement 
on earlier law, although an accused person still lacks the right to a 
dedicated defense “advocate.” 121  Naluwairo argues that Section 
201(2), which prohibits a court member from “disassociating” himself 
from a decision, effectively limits the use of dissents, thus impairing 
the independence and impartiality of judges.122 Finally, the manner in 
which courts martial are constituted, especially with regard to 
appointment of serving military officers as judges, the limited use of 
fixed terms (one year for general court martial members) and limited 
requirements for legal expertise, 123  raises concerns about the 
competence, independence, and impartiality of military judges.124 Not 
only is there a risk of bias on the part of the judges hearing the case, 
there is also a substantial risk of command influence and having 
cases/sentencing decided even before trial. 
Uganda has also enacted a 2002 Anti-Terrorism Act125 and a 
2012 Prevention and Prohibition of Torture Act. 126  Both statutes 
provide considerably enhanced governmental authorities to 
investigate and prosecute a broad range of offenses. The 2002 Anti-
Terrorism Act proscribes a range of terrorist acts, labels four groups 
                                                                                                                                           
120. The UPDF Act 2005 also recognizes two non-court martial authorities. Under 
Article 195, a summary trial authority can hear and decide non-capital cases and, under Article 
205, a unit disciplinary committee can impose a range of punishments. Both authorities 
provide limited rights to defendants. Article 205 bars the presence of advocates, but allows the 
accused the right to demand trial by court martial. Under Article 191 (3)(a), the summary trial 
authority can impose a punishment of up to six months detention. Under Article 195(4), the 
unit disciplinary committee can impose any punishment allowed by law (without definition). 
In any case, these two “non-court martial authorities” lack many fair trial guarantees and are 
subject to abuse. See Naluwairo, supra note 103, at 154-62. 
121. It is noteworthy that the field court martial still retains the power to impose the 
death sentence and the accused lacks any statutory appellate rights from that forum. UPDF Act 
(2005), art. 227. See also Naluwairo, supra note 103, at 127-28. 
122. Naluwairo, supra note 103, at 162-63. 
123. There is, for example, no requirement for the judges at the division and general 
court martial to be trained lawyers, only that a trained judge advocate advise each court during 
proceedings and deliberations. UPDF Act (2005), arts. 194, 197, 198, 202.  
124. Naluwairo, supra note 103, at 185-200. 
125. The Anti-Terrorism Act (2002) (Uganda). 
126. The Prevention and Prohibition of Torture Act (2012) (Act No. 3) (Uganda). This 
statute effectively domesticates Uganda’s international law obligation under The Convention 
against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Nov. 10, 
1984. Id. Uganda’s accession to the treaty was effective on November 3, 1986. See Convention 
of Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (Dec. 10, 1984), 
1465 U.N.T.S. 85, https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/MTDSG/Volume%20I/Chapter%  
20IV/iv-9.en.pdf (last visited June 14, 2015). 
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as terrorist organizations specifically including the LRA,127 provides 
for enhanced investigatory authorities for the government, extra-
territorial application (long-arm jurisdiction), and makes certain 
offenses triable and bailable only by the High Court.128 This broad 
statute clearly drives at many of the practices used by the LRA over 
the past twenty-seven years to include murder, kidnapping, maiming, 
and attacking.129 
The 2012 Torture statute should be a particularly effective tool 
against both eliminating abusive police/military practices and groups 
such as the LRA.130 The statute sweeps broadly, including persons 
acting in an official capacity, as well as rebel/terror groups that 
practice torture.131 On one hand, there have been frequent reports by 
human rights groups of police and military personnel using torture 
and coerced confessions, particularly within the context of treason 
charges, over the past decades. 132  The effective and even-handed 
implementation of this statute should go a long way to overcoming 
                                                                                                                                           
127. The Lord’s Resistance Army, the Lord’s Resistance Movement, Allied Democratic 
Forces, and al Qaeda. See The Anti-Terrorism Act, supra note 125, Second Schedule.  
128. Id.  §§ 4, 6, 17. 
129. Id. § 7 (defining terrorism to include murder, kidnapping, maiming, and attacking).  
This statute became effective on June 7, 2002 and cannot be applied retroactively to earlier 
acts committed by the LRA under the Uganda Constitution, Article 28 (prohibiting against 
retroactive criminal legislation). This statute cannot, however, be used to prosecute civilians in 
a military court martial. See Naluwairo, supra note 103, at 125 (citing Uganda Law Society v. 
Attorney General of the Republic of Uganda (2006) UGCC 10 (Constitutional Petition No. 1). 
130. The Prevention and Prohibition of Torture Act (2012) §§ 2(1)(a), 3(2)(a)(b)(d). 
131. Id. 
132. See, e.g., Uganda v. Okot & 12 Ors. (2012) UGHC 97 (discussing that the High 
Court dismissed charges of treason and misprision of treason against thirteen persons who had 
been accused of membership in a rebel organization known as the Popular Patriotic Front; the 
court found that the prosecution had offered unreliable and inconsistent evidence, necessitating 
acquittals based upon a failure to establish a prima facie case). This kind of result raises 
questions about the quality of the underlying police investigation, as well as the DPP’s 
decision to prosecute. It is also noteworthy that misprision of treason, that is a person 
“knowing that any person intends to commit treason and does not give information thereof 
with all reasonable dispatch” to the authorities, can be sentenced to life imprisonment. Id. 
(citing the Uganda Penal Code, Article 25). See Hostile to Democracy: The Movement System 
and Political Repression in Uganda, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Oct. 1999), 
https://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/1999/uganda/. See also Open Secret: Illegal Detention and 
Torture by the Joint Anti-Terrorism Task Force in Uganda, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Apr. 2009), 
https://www.hrw.org/report/2009/04/08/open-secret/illegal-detention-and-torture-joint-anti-
terrorism-task-force-uganda [hereinafter Open Secret, HUM. RTS. WATCH] (arguing that the 
Anti-Terrorism Act is overbroad and could be used against opponents of the government even 
when there has been no criminal activity). 
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public concerns about heavy-handed police practices. On the other 
hand, the statute could also be a very effective tool against groups 
such as the LRA. In fact, many of the LRA practices could be 
construed as torture against abducted persons (who are often 
subjected to beatings, forced to maim/kill others, and raped) and 
against the public at-large (e.g., causing the former “night commuter” 
problem in the Acholi districts133). 
The 2000 Amnesty Act was “predicated on a general desire to 
bring an end to the acute and often vicious violence that had 
characterized Uganda as a polity since the 1960s.” 134 The statute was 
designed to encompass numerous different rebel groups that have 
plagued Uganda since January 1986, to include the LRA, the Allied 
Democratic Front (“ADF”), the West Nile Bank Front, and others. 
While the Act was later amended in 2006 and Part II (the amnesty 
provisions) was allowed to lapse briefly in 2012, the Act was in full 
force through May 2015.135 This raises the issue of whether Kony and 
other senior LRA officers could claim the protections of this Act 
under the principle of lex mitior (i.e., the milder law) as a defense 
against prosecution for certain offenses that he may have committed 
while the Act was in force. 
There are mixed views in Uganda regarding the propriety of the 
Amnesty Act, especially in terms of whether it furthers the national 
interests in bringing about peace, justice and national 
reconciliation.136 This situation is complicated by the fact there is no 
clear distinction between combatants and non-combatants with regard 
to LRA membership. LRA members range on a “gray” scale from the 
                                                                                                                                           
133. The “night commuter” problem involving children who, fearing abduction by the 
LRA, would leave their villages every day to seek refuge for the night in the nearest town. 
Keith Morrison & Tim Sandler, Children of war in Uganda, DATELINE NBC (Sept. 26, 2006),  
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/9006024/ns/dateline_nbc/t/children-war-uganda/. 
134. Republic of Uganda, Report of the Committee, supra note 101, at 4. 
135. Kasandre Sarah Kihika & Meritxell Regue, Pursuing Accountability for Serious 
Crimes in Uganda’s Courts: Reflections on the Thomas Kwoyelo Case, ICTJ BRIEFING 7 (Jan. 
22, 2015) (explaining the parliamentary irregularities in the lapse/reinstatement of the law). 
136. Republic of Uganda, Report of the Committee, supra note 101, at 12-18. See also 
Abdul Tejan-Cole, Painful Peace—Amnesty under the Lome Peace Agreement, 3 LAW, 
DEMOCRACY AND DEVELOPMENT 239, 242-43, 252 (1999) (noting the criticisms raised by the 
international community against the blanket amnesty that was offered to senior rebel leaders in 
the 1999 Lome Peace Agreement that would have ended the civil war in Sierra Leone and 
arguing that true peace and reconciliation cannot be achieved without addressing the rights and 
interests of the victims). 
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recently abducted children who have been forced to participate in 
acts, to adult members who—over a long period of time—have 
become intimidated and even willing participants.137 Culpability is 
relative. On one hand, many people in northern Uganda support the 
Amnesty Act because they want to see an end to the drawn-out 
conflict; many of these people want the missing children to come 
home, even if it means there is some level of impunity.138 In fact, the 
Act encourages combatants to return home and reintegrate into 
society, although there is evidence that the resettlement and 
reintegration programs could/should be better funded.139 On the other 
hand, there are many people who believe that Kony and his followers 
have left such a wake of death and destruction that he and his 
followers should be held accountable; the critics believe that the Act 
promotes impunity and undermines human rights.140 
One interesting case involves LRA Major General Caesar 
Acellam, who had been initially abducted by the LRA in 1988 and 
eventually captured by the UPDF in May 2012 in the Central African 
Republic, and granted amnesty earlier this year. 141  This case 
                                                                                                                                           
137 . Hope Among, Challenges in Prosecuting Former Child Soldiers in Uganda’s 
International Crimes Division, 18 E. AFRICAN J. OF PEACE & HUM. RTS. 336 (2012). This 
article reviews many of the important considerations that are involved in making a decision 
regarding the propriety of pursuing a criminal prosecution or a grant of amnesty. The author 
notes that many former combatants do not even know their own age, much less have a birth 
certificate, making it difficult to determine a person’s age at the time a crime was committed; 
that the brainwashing that occurred had impacted the person’s ability to understand the nature 
and extent (unlawfulness) of their actions; that the children had, in most cases, been abducted 
and had been forced to participate in crimes in order to survive; and that some children had 
been supplied with alcohol or drugs to fortify their resolve. 
138. Prudence Acirokop, A with Truth Commission for Uganda? Opportunities and 
Challenges, 12 AFRICAN HUM. RTS. L. J. 417, 431 (2012). Acirokop notes that “[a]mnesty was 
always perceived as a vital tool in conflict resolution and in longer-term reconciliation and 
peace within the specific context of Northern Uganda as it resonates specific cultural 
understanding of justice.” Id.  
139. Republic of Uganda, Report of the Committee, supra note 101, at 39. 
140. UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, UN Position on Uganda’s 
Amnesty Act, Submission to the Hon. Minister of Internal Affairs, 4-10 (May 2012). This 
document argues that blanket amnesty is inconsistent with Uganda’s obligation to prosecute 
international crimes, such as war crimes, crimes against humanity, and gross violations of 
human rights. This document also argues that the “Amnesty Act similarly contradicts 
Uganda’s obligations arising from the Rome Statute.”  
141. Samuel Okiror, Forgive and forget? Amnesty dilemma haunts Uganda, IRIN NEWS 
(June 12, 2015), http://www.irinnews.org/fr/report/101625/forgive-and-forget-amnesty-
dilemma-ha unts-uganda (describing the tensions in providing amnesty to Acellam). See 
generally Mark Kersten, A Rebel’s Escape—An LRA Commander Tells His Story, JUSTICE IN 
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illustrates the tension between encouraging amnesty, one of the few 
benefits that can be had by rebels in a non-international armed 
conflict, as a means of ending a conflict and the need for 
accountability. Many people might ask how Uganda can grant 
amnesty to such a senior officer, at one point the fourth most senior 
officer in the LRA, one who planned and participated in so many war 
crimes over a twenty-four-year period. Many people might also ask 
how far Uganda should go in the interests of reconciliation. This no 
doubt leaves the DPP with a difficult decision on whether to grant 
amnesty: how old was this person when abducted? What were the 
circumstances of his/her captivity? What acts did the person willingly 
commit? Unfortunately, the credible, admissible evidence may be 
lacking in many cases and the interests of justice may require the 
grant of amnesty. 
In terms of international law, Uganda is party to two treaties that 
recognize and encourage amnesties even if neither instrument is 
directly applicable to the Uganda/LRA conflict. Under Article 6(5) to 
the 1977 Additional Protocol II,  
 . . . at the end of hostilities, the authorities in power shall 
endeavour to grant the broadest possible amnesty to persons who 
have participated in the armed conflict, or those deprived of their 
liberty for reasons related to the armed conflict, whether they are 
interned or detained.142 
Under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, States 
may grant amnesty for all cases where capital punishment may be 
imposed.143 In addition, the Ugandan Parliament has also recognized 
that a ban on amnesties is not part of customary international law, 
noting the inconsistent state practice and conflicting legal opinions.144 
Uganda has enacted a 2010 ICC statute145 that domesticates the 
Rome Statute. The ICC Act addresses issues regarding persons 
                                                                                                                                           
CONFLICT (July 31, 2013), https://justiceinconflict.org/2013/07/31/a-rebels-escape-an-lra-
commander-tells-his-story/. 
142. AP II, supra note 7, art. 6, § 5,. 
143. ICCPR, supra note 8, art. 6, § 4. 
144. Republic of Uganda, Report of the Committee, supra note 101, at 28-29. 
145 . The International Criminal Court Act (2010) (Uganda). See generally Sarah 
Nouwen, The ICC’s Intervention in Uganda: Which Rule of Law Does It Promote?, 
(University of Cambridge Legal Studies Research Paper, No. 22/2012, Aug. 2012) [hereinafter 
The ICC’s Intervention in Uganda] (providing a useful history of the domestication of the 
Rome Statute into Ugandan law, to include the pressures on the Executive and Parliament). 
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accused of international crimes and cooperation with the ICC itself. In 
part, sections of this Act apply to any requests by the ICC, any 
enforcement of the ICC, or any investigation or sitting of the ICC, 
regardless of whether the action relates to a matter that “was 
committed before the coming into force of this Act.”146 This statute 
provides the International Crimes Division (“ICD”) of the High Court 
with the jurisdiction to hear cases arising from this statute. 147  In 
addition, the ICC Act incorporates new of modes of liability, such as 
the doctrine of command responsibility, under Ugandan law.148 This 
statute, unlike the Ugandan Penal Code, excludes the application of 
the death penalty.149 There have, however, been questions about the 
adequacy of the ICC Act, to include witness and victim protection, as 
well as when the DPP will apply the 2000 Amnesty Act.150 
While the ICC may not recognize amnesties or traditional 
reconciliation practices, it may not make a difference if the Amnesty 
Act is applied to less culpable (less senior) LRA officers or their 
family members. Nonetheless, the Act should be amended to define 
the circumstances in which a person may qualify for amnesty. First, if 
there are senior officers of the LRA who will be subject to 
prosecution even if captured (as opposed to those who voluntarily 
                                                                                                                                           
146. The International Criminal Court Act, 2010, Part I, art. 1. 
147. The ICD, formerly known as the War Crimes Division, sits as a bench of three 
judges and was established by the Uganda High Court in July 2008. The ICD has subject 
matter jurisdiction over “any offence relating to genocide, crimes against humanity, war 
crimes, terrorism, human trafficking, piracy and any other international crime as may be 
provided for under the Penal Code Act, Cap 120, The Geneva Conventions Act, Cap 363, The 
International Criminal Court Act, No. 11 of 2010 or under any other penal enactment.” The 
Republic of Uganda (The Judiciary), International Crimes Division, available at 
http://www.judiciary.go.ug/data/smenu/18/International%20Crimes%20Division.html (last 
visited June 14, 2015). As of September 2011, the case of former LRA officer Thomas 
Kwoyelo was the first one it had heard. McNamara, supra note 40, at 653. Apparently, the 
ICD has had only a limited number of cases before it, to include the July 2010 terrorist 
bombing of the Ethiopian Village Restaurant in Kampala. See generally Omar Awadh & 10 
Ors v. Attorney General,  UGCC 18 (2014). 
148. See, e.g., The Rome Statute, supra note 14, at art. (a)(i) (incorporating a known or 
should be known standard for military commanders and other superiors); International 
Criminal Court Act 2010, Article 19 (a)(i). In fact, the Rome Statute incorporates the 
Yamashita standard. See also Michael L. Smidt, Yamashita, Medina, and Beyond: Command 
Responsibility in Contemporary Military Operations, 164 MIL. L. REV. 155, 209-11 (2000). 
149. Compare The Rome Statute, supra note 14, Article 77(1) (imposing imprisonment 
for “no more than 30 years” or life imprisonment “by extreme gravity of the crime and 
individual circumstances”), with the ICC Act, 2010, Part II, Articles 7-9 (imposing terms of 
imprisonment for “life or a lesser term”). 
150. McNamara, supra note 40, at 659. 
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renounced the fight by surrendering), those persons should be 
identified by name. Clearly, there should be a distinction between 
senior LRA officers culpable for planning and coercing others (i.e., 
have “command responsibility”) and less senior people who 
participate for lack of choice in the matter. Second, the Act should be 
clarified on whether a captured person will be allowed to qualify for 
amnesty. This would act as incentive for persons to surrender; such 
persons would have to choose whether to stay “in the bush” and risk 
death/trial, or surrender and claim the benefits of amnesty. Third, the 
government could clarify whether unnamed child soldiers (under a 
certain age) would be granted amnesty for previously committed 
crimes. Finally, the government should publicly announce a cut-off 
date for surrender, after which the Act would be allowed to lapse. 
This might prevent some persons from staying in the fight and 
committing continuing crimes, but then later requesting amnesty at an 
advantageous time. 
There have been long-standing and substantial human rights 
complaints levied against Ugandan law enforcement agencies. 151 
Indeed, both the Ugandan Police and the Joint Anti-Terrorism Task 
Force (“JATT”) have been criticized for a wide range of human rights 
abuses to include unlawful killings, torture, and abuses against 
suspects. 152   JATT is a joint, inter-agency organization that was 
formed in 1999 using personnel from the UPDF, the Uganda Police, 
and the intelligence organizations to combat the ADF.153 JATT lacks 
a statutory mandate and has been under the operational control of the 
Chieftaincy of Military Intelligence (“CMI”). 154  Typically, JATT 
personnel operate in civilian clothes and drive unmarked cars and 
                                                                                                                                           
151. Brooke J. Oppenheimer, From Arrest to Release: The Inside Story of Uganda’s 
Penal System, 16 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 117, 120-41 (2005) (describing the corruption, 
incompetence, and inefficiency in the Uganda Police, the court system, and the prison service). 
See also State of Pain: Torture in Uganda, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Mar. 2004), https://www.hrw. 
org/sites/default/files/reports/uganda0304.pdf. 
152. See Open Secret, HUM. RTS. WATCH, supra note 132, at 61, 92 (referring to both 
the police and JATT). See generally U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, UGANDA 2013 HUMAN RIGHTS 
REPORT (2013), http://photos.state.gov/libraries/adana/766947/public/uganda_2013_human_
rights_report.pdf (last visited Jan. 12, 2017) (referring to the police). 
153. See Open Secret, HUM. RTS. WATCH, supra note 132. The JATT’s mission has since 
expanded to include treason cases and other terrorist threats to Uganda. Id. at 20-22, 25-26. 
154. According to Human Rights Watch, the government originally intended that the 
JATT would be under the command of the Inspector General of Police, but —when it appeared 
that the police could not manage the organization—it was transferred to the CMI.  Id. at 20. 
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each officer uses the statutory authorities he has from his home 
organization/command.155 
JATT has been accused of arbitrarily arresting suspected 
terrorists; holding suspects in lengthy pre-trial detention, often 
waiting months if ever to bring a suspect before a magistrate156; using 
ungazetted detention facilities (i.e., safe houses)157; using torture and 
other abusive interrogation practices; and even extrajudicial 
killings.158 While the CMI, Brigadier James Mugira, has promised to 
investigate all claims of human rights abuses made against JATT,159 it 
is unclear whether or to what extent the previously identified 
problems have been corrected. In fact, Human Rights Watch found no 
evidence that police and military personnel had been held accountable 
for any prior abuses. 160  In any case, there are substantial issues 
regarding the impartiality and integrity of law enforcement 
investigations, including confused and overlapping police and 
military law enforcement authorities. 
Some people believe that the Ugandan Police, followed by the 
judiciary, is the most corrupt institution in the country.161  Indeed, 
abusive police practices, particularly if biased towards the 
government, as well as excessive delays and costs in court 
proceedings, are conducive to corruption since people are left with 
few options but to buy their way out of a bad situation.162 While this 
                                                                                                                                           
155. Id. In certain respects, this command arrangement is not unlike a joint federal/state 
task force used in the United States to investigate a major criminal incident. Nonetheless, the 
manner in which the JATT conducts its investigations and operations is quite different from 
any American counterparts. 
156. CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA, supra note 87, art. 23(4)(b) requires 
that an arrested person be brought to court within 48 hours from arrest. Still, while the same 
article discusses persons “restricted or detained,” it imposes no similar requirement for judicial 
review. See art. 23(5). This creates an opening for abuse. 
157. The 1995 Uganda Constitution proscribes the holding of prisoners in “ungazetted” 
places, namely unacknowledged locations that are not published in the official gazette. 
CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA, supra note 87,  art. 23, § 2, art. 49, §2. While 
police stations are typically gazetted “legal” facilities, other places such as military barracks, 
“safe houses,” and offices are not. Open Secret, HUM. RTS. WATCH, supra note 132, at 13. 
158. See generally Open Secret, HUM. RTS. WATCH, supra note 132. 
159. Id. at 58-60. 
160. Id. at 5. 
161. See generally Sarah Namulondo, Uganda Police Named Most Corrupt Institution, 
INDEPENDENT (KAMPALA) (Dec. 11, 2012), http://allafrica.com/stories/201212120304.html. 
162. On its Corruption Perceptions Index for 2014, Transparency International ranks 
Uganda as 142nd of the 175 countries in the world. Corruption Perceptions Index 2014, 
TRANSPARENCY INT’L (2014), available at http://www.transparency.org/cpi2014/results; 
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report, prepared jointly by the Inspectorate of Government and 
Makerere University, indicates that the removal of corrupt officials 
has been a priority for at least some senior officials and some progress 
has been made, the level corruption in 2012 (Uganda Police, 48%; 
judiciary, 24.8%) indicates that this is a deep-seated problem that 
requires a long-term effort. 163  According to Transparency 
International, “in spite of recent investigations and corruption trials, 
an effective enforcement of the laws in place is still lacking.” 164 
Uganda’s government should place renewed emphasis on this critical 
shortcoming. 
In conclusion, Uganda has a well-structured judiciary with a 
range of statutory instruments suitable for addressing an array of 
national security issues. Still, some instruments would be more 
effective for prosecuting LRA members than others. The 
administration of justice has, however, several important 
shortcomings with regard to its 2000 Amnesty Act, abusive police 
practices, and corruption. 
C. Notable National Security Cases: Steps & Missteps 
Uganda’s courts have had limited, albeit evolving experience 
with contentious national security cases. This makes it difficult to 
make generalized statements about a defendant’s ability to get a fair 
trial in such cases. Nonetheless, several recent court cases indicate a 
need for caution in deciding the best means of handling high visibility 
cases such as the prosecution of Kony, his senior officers, and LRA 
members. Indeed, the ICD, as a recently established court, has had a 
limited caseload and has been challenged by a lack of resources.165 
                                                                                                                                           
see Deborah Hardoon & Finn Heinrich, Daily Lives and Corruption: Public Opinion in East 
Africa, TRANSPARENCY INT’L, App. C, 47-49 (May 10, 2012), available at http://www.
transparency.org/whatwedo/publication/daily_lives_and_corruption_east_africa (finding based 
on a survey of 1,025 Ugandans that the police and judiciary were perceived as the two most 
corrupt institutions; that eighty-seven percent of those surveyed has paid a bribe; and that the 
police and judiciary were the top recipients of these bribes). 
163. Uganda, TRANSPARENCY INT’L (2015), http://www.transparency.org/country/UGA 
(last visited June 23, 2015). See Deborah Hardoon & Finn Heinrich, supra note 162. 
164. Maira Martini, Uganda: Overview of Corruption and Anti-Corruption, 
TRANSPARENCY INT’L ANTI-CORRUPTION HELP DESK, U4 Helpdesk Expert Answer No. 379, 
1 (April 8, 2013), http://www.transparency.org/files/content/ corruptionqas/379_Uganda_ 
Overview_of_corruption_and_anticorruption.pdf. 
165. See Elise Keppler, Justice for Serious Crimes before National Courts: Uganda’s 
International Crimes Division, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Jan. 2012) at 1, 16-20, https://www.  
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The Kwoyelo case, 166  involving war crimes committed while the 
defendant was in the LRA, is a case of first impression in Uganda. 
Though the defendant was taken prisoner over ten years ago, the case 
is still not ready for trial and the recent decision of the Ugandan 
Supreme Court on constitutional issues failed to resolve several 
important points such as the characterization of the conflict or 
whether he could be charged with grave breaches. The trial against a 
political rival and former friend of the president, Dr. Kizza Besigye, 
revealed a contentious and even disrespectful relationship between the 
courts and the security services with serious due process 
implications.167The difficult procedural history of his case illustrates 
the problems associated with permitting the trial of civilians before 
military courts martial; the defendant has faced simultaneous 
prosecutions in geographically separated proceedings for the same 
underlying acts with confrontations between the Executive and the 
courts, resulting in unreasonable delays. And, finally, the Awadh case 
illustrates challenging legal issues and security difficulties faced by 
Ugandan courts in high profile terrorism cases.168 In short, one could 
properly ask whether or to what extent Uganda’s judiciary is able to 
decide complex, contentious cases in a timely manner. 
Thomas Kwoyelo is a former LRA colonel who was captured by 
the UPDF in the DRC in 2005.169 He was subsequently brought back 
to Uganda and in 2010, while at the Upper Prison, Luzira, he declared 
before a prison official that he was renouncing rebellion and seeking 
amnesty.170 The Amnesty Commission, believing Kwoyelo qualified 
for amnesty, referred his petition to the DPP. Instead, the DPP 
                                                                                                                                           
hrw.org/report/2012/01/15/justice-serious-crimes-national-courts/ugandas-international-
crimes-division (reporting that defendants have lacked access to counsel, to include adequate 
time to prepare; that the remuneration for “state brief” (government-paid defense counsel) has 
been inadequate, making it difficult for a defendant to retain experienced counsel; that the 
practice in the Uganda judiciary of rotating staff and the lack of legal assistants increases the 
burden on judges; that Ugandan judges and counsel lack experience with complex criminal 
cases; and that Uganda lacks a witness protection program); see also Kihika & Regue, supra 
note 135 at 8 (recommending that Uganda provide the ICD with adequate resources to carry 
out its mandate and provide the accused with adequate resources to obtain a fair trial). 
166. Uganda v. Kwoyelo, 2015 UGSC 5. 
167.See generally Omar Awadh & 10 Others v. Attorney General, 2014 UGCC 18 
(Consolidated Const. Petition Nos. 55 and 56 of 2011). 
168. Id. 
169. Uganda v. Kwoyelo, 2015 UGSC 5. 
170.Id. 
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brought criminal charges against him under the 1964 Geneva 
Conventions Act, to include its grave breaches section under Article 2 
of the Act, and the Uganda Penal Code.171The case was committed to 
trial before the ICD. Kwoyelo requested a “reference” to the 
Constitutional Court,172 on the basis that he qualified for amnesty and 
that the DPP had taken discriminatory action against him by indicting 
him despite granting other similarly situated former LRA members 
amnesty.173 The Constitutional Court held the Amnesty Act did not 
violate the nation’s international treaty obligations or diminish the 
prosecutorial powers of the DPP. The Constitutional Court did, 
however, hold that Kwoyelo had been discriminated against in 
violation of Article 21(1)(2) of the Uganda Constitution.174 On April 
11, 2012, the Attorney General appealed the case to the Ugandan 
Supreme Court, but the case could not be heard until March of 2014 
because the court lacked a quorum.175 
In a unanimous opinion by Chief Justice Bart Magunda 
Katureebe, the Ugandan Supreme Court carefully considered the 
Amnesty Act and the prosecutorial discretion of the DPP in deciding 
                                                                                                                                           
171.Id. 
172. Uganda’s Constitution permits the Court of Appeal to sit as a constitutional court 
and hear petitions from trial courts—other than field courts martial—to decide issues of 
constitutional interpretation. CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA, supra note 87, art. 
137. 
173. Kwoyelo offered two examples involving officers who had been senior to him: 
Brigadier Kenneth Banya who was captured by the UPDF in 2004 and Brigadier Sam Kolo, 
the LRA’s top negotiator, who had surrendered in 2005, but the Court said that there was no 
evidence either had committed the same crimes as the defendant. Uganda v. Kwoyelo, 2015 
UGSC 5. 
174. Id. CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA, supra note 87, art. 21 provides: 
“(1) All persons are equal before and under the law in all spheres of political, economic, social 
and cultural life and in every other respect and shall enjoy equal protection of the law. (2) 
Wthout prejudice to clause (1) of this article, a person shall not be discriminated against on the 
ground of sex, race, colour, ethnic origin, tribe, birth, creed or religion, or social or economic 
standing, political opinion or disability. (3) For the purposes of this article, "discriminate" 
means to give different treatment to different persons attributable only or mainly to their 
respective descriptions by sex, race, colour, ethnic origin, tribe, birth, creed or religion, or 
social or economic standing, political opinion or disability. 
175. Kihika & Regue, supra note 135, at 1; see also Anthony Wesaka & Perez Rumanzi, 
The Task Ahead for Chief Justice Katureebe, DAILY MONITOR (KAMPALA) (Mar. 6, 2015), 
http://www.monitor.co.ug/News/National/task-ahead-Chief-Justice-Katureebe/688334-
2643262-ftmxrsz/index.html (noting the two-year delay in the appointment of a new Chief 
Justice and the impact that delay had upon the Uganda judiciary). The Constitution requires a 
full bench of all members when hearing appeals from decisions of the Court of Appeals. 
CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA, supra note 87, art. 131(2). 
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the propriety of criminal charges against the defendant.176 The court 
then focused on eligibility for amnesty under the Act which provides: 
(1) An amnesty is declared in respect of any Ugandan who has at 
any time since the 26th day of January, 1986, engaged in or is 
engaging in war or armed rebellion against the government of the 
Republic of Uganda by– 
(a) actual participation in combat; 
(b) collaborating with the perpetrators of the war or armed 
rebellion; 
(c) committing any other crime in the furtherance of the 
war or armed rebellion; or 
(d) assisting or aiding the conduct or prosecution of the war 
or armed rebellion.177 
The key issue for the court was the meaning of subsection (c), 
“committing any other crime in the furtherance of the war or armed 
rebellion.” The Court found that the Act did not provide blanket 
amnesty and that the DPP had an obligation to determine whether a 
person seeking amnesty qualified in terms of whether his prior crimes 
had been committed in furtherance or in the cause of war.178 The court 
then examined Uganda’s obligations under the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights and the 1949 Geneva Conventions; here, the court 
found that the conflict “may be said to largely be not of an 
international character,” 179  but that it took on an international 
character when it spread to neighboring countries include Sudan and 
the DRC. The court then made a useful distinction between acts “not 
justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and 
wantonly,” and those acts “in furtherance of the war or rebellion.”180 
Finally, the court turned to the claim of discrimination when 
other rebels had been granted amnesty.181 Here, the court examined 
the Juba Agreements between the government and the LRA.182 Even 
                                                                                                                                           
176. See generally Uganda v. Kwoyelo, 2015 UGSC 5. 
177. Amnesty Act (2000), Part I § 2 (Uganda) 3 (emphasis added). 
178. See also UN Position on Uganda’s Amnesty Act, supra note 140. 
179. See Uganda v. Kwoyelo, 2015 UGSC 5. 
180. Id. 
181.Id. 
182 . See Uganda v. Kwoyelo, 2015 UGSC 5. The government and the LRA/LRM 
negotiated two agreements during the 2006-08 period. Initially, the parties negotiated the 
Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation between the Government of the Republic of 
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though the agreements were never finalized, the court noted that the 
“substantive provisions of this agreement [contemplated] that 
individuals should take personal responsibility for grave breaches of 
the law, only that such persons should be guaranteed fair hearing 
before an impartial Court.”183 In other words, the court was saying 
that LRA leaders knew that the government did not plan to grant 
blanket amnesty and that some persons would be prosecuted for 
serious offenses. Indeed, the ICD was created with this purpose in 
mind. The court found that the prosecution of one person for crimes 
committed, but not that of another for acts that may/may not have 
been the same, did not constitute discrimination in violation of the 
Constitution. Moreover, the court explained that the DPP did not have 
to enumerate his reasons for not granting amnesty to this defendant. 
While the court was undoubtedly correct to remand the case to 
the ICD for trial, its analysis was flawed in several respects.184 First, 
the Court did not examine the characterization of the conflict as either 
non-international or international armed conflict in any detail. The 
conflict began as a rebellion before morphing into a non-international 
armed conflict, but the LRA, as an organized armed group, has long 
since become a criminal (terror) organization that preys on innocent 
civilians. Kony has arguably abandoned his fight against Uganda, first 
with his 2006 move into the DRC and, after December of 2008, with 
his further movement west, away from Uganda. Kony likely now 
seeks only his own survival. And, if the group has received outside 
support from Sudan or has crossed through at least three foreign 
countries (Sudan, the DRC and the Central African Republic) that 
                                                                                                                                           
Uganda and the Lord’s Resistance Army, Juba, Sudan, signed on June 29, 2007. [hereinafter  
Juba Agreements]. This principal agreement was later followed by the Annexure to Agreement 
on Accountability and Reconciliation, signed on February 19, 2008. This annexure called for a 
commission to investigate the causes of the conflict, including the human rights violations 
caused by either side; to ensure that serious crimes are addressed by a special division of the 
Uganda High Court, as well as traditional and alternative justice mechanisms; to create a unit 
to investigate and prosecute cases; and to promote reparations to victims. While Kony never 
showed up for the final ceremony, the government elected to implement the agreement 
unilaterally.  
183. Uganda v. Kwoyelo, 2015 UGSC 5. 
184. This decision did, however, directly answer several of the points raised by the UN 
Commissioner. See UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, supra note 140. 
The Uganda Supreme Court held that the Act was not a blanket amnesty and that the DPP had 
prosecutorial discretion in making the distinction between more culpable persons guilty of war 
crimes, crimes against humanity and gross violations of human rights, and the less culpable 
persons who could be granted amnesty. Uganda v. Kwoyelo, 2015 UGSC 5. 
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does not necessarily mean that an international armed conflict exists. 
Indeed, the conflict could probably be characterized as an 
internationalized non-international armed conflict. Second, the court 
discussed the 1977 Additional Protocol II, but there is no indication 
that it applies to this conflict. 
Next, there are serious questions about whether Kwoyelo can be 
charged with grave breaches under Article 147 of the Geneva 
Convention IV, as opposed to either violation of the Uganda Penal 
Code or war crimes. This will turn on what the exact offenses with 
which he is charged and when and where he is alleged to have 
committed those acts. It is conceivable that Geneva Convention IV 
may apply at some points in the conflict, particularly where it might 
be construed as international in character, but not others. Here, the 
court used terminology interchangeably, no doubt introducing a level 
of confusion into the case, sometimes referring to grave breaches, 
gross crimes, gross human rights violations, and serious personal 
crimes. Indeed, at one point the court said that the Juba Agreement 
“make [sic] it clear that individuals should take personal 
responsibility for grave breaches of the law,” but that term of art 
appears nowhere in the agreement.185 It will matter greatly to the trial 
court, the DPP and the defendant what the particular terms mean and 
how they are used in this case. Can Kwoyelo be held accountable for 
“grave breaches” under either Ugandan statutory or international law? 
The court has failed to provide the trial court any legal or fact finding 
guidance on this critical issue. 
The treason case against Dr. Kizza Besigye is a cautionary tale 
about the role of politics in the administration of justice in Uganda.186 
The case demonstrates that abusive and discriminatory treatment can 
occur when military and civilian jurisdiction is exercised 
simultaneously over the same acts. Dr. (Colonel) Besigye, who had 
been President Museveni’s physician during the 1980 through 1986 
bush war to overthrow the prior government, retired from the UPDF 
                                                                                                                                           
185. Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation Between the Government of the 
Republic of Uganda and the Lord’s Resistance Army/Movement, Uganda-LRA, June 29, 2007  
(using alternative terms such as serious crimes, human rights violations, or serious criminal 
charges.) 
186. See generally Dr. Kizza Besigye & Others v. Attorney General, 2010 UGCC 6, 
Const. Petition No. 07 (2007). According to Human Rights Watch, the Ugandan government 
has a “tendency to use the charge of treason to silence political opponents and those critical of 
the government.” Open Secret, HUM. RTS. WATCH, supra note 132, at 22. 
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in 2001. 187  He proceeded to become the leader of the largest 
opposition political party, the Forum for Democratic Change 
(“FDC”).188 He accused the government of corruption and pushed for 
the end of the “movement” system of “non-party” government.189 
Reportedly, President Museveni responded with threats of 
disciplinary proceedings and prosecution in military courts. 190  Dr. 
Besigye was then arrested on allegations of membership in the 
shadowy People’s Redemption Army (“PRA”) and in connection with 
an alleged plot to overthrow the government between the years of 
2001 and 2004. He, along with several others, was charged with 
treason and misprision of treason. Subsequently, Dr. Besigye and his 
co-conspirators applied for amnesty, but the record is not clear 
whether the government acted on their petition. On November 16, 
2005, while making bail applications at the High Court of Uganda in 
Uganda, the defendants were seized by an armed JATT team and 
taken to Luzira Maximum Security Prison near Kampala. 191  On 
November 24 at Makindye Military Barracks (in Kampala), the 
government then commenced a general court martial charging 
terrorism, rape,192 and unlawful possession of a firearm. In December 
of 2005, despite an injunction by the High Court ordering the stay of 
court martial proceedings, the UPDF ignored the order and continued 
its proceedings.193 On January 31, 2006, based upon a petition from 
the Uganda Law Society, the Constitutional Court held that the trial in 
                                                                                                                                           
187. Profile of Main Opposition Leader Kizza Besigye, IRIN NEWS (Feb. 15, 2006), 
http://www.irinnews.org/report/58147/uganda-profile-of-main-opposition-leader-kiiza-besigye 
(last visited June 17, 2015). 
188. The FDC makes plain its opposition to President Museveni, his policies, and his 
unprecedented time in office. In that respect, Dr. Besigye is undoubtedly a lightning rod for the 
opposition, and the government’s actions against him have clearly served as a catalyst for 
protests. FORUM FOR DEMOCRATIC CHANGE, http://www.fdcuganda.org/ (last visited June 17, 
2015). 
189. See Naluwairo, supra note 103, at 212. 
190. Id. 
191. Besigye & Others v. Attorney General, supra note 186. This incident is referred to 
in the dramatized court decision as the “First Court Siege.” According to Human Rights 
Watch, this siege and a later one conducted in March 2007, were actually conducted by the 
“Black Mamba Hit Squad,” a shadowy intelligence organization. Open Secret, HUM. RTS. 
WATCH, supra note 132, at 16. 
192. The rape charge was based on a 1997 accusation. Profile of Main Opposition 
Leader Kizza Besigye, IRIN NEWS, supra note 187. In fact, the court that ultimately dismissed 
the charge did so by raising serious questions about the adequacy of the evidence, implying 
that the evidence could have been fabricated. Naluwairo, supra note 103, at 213-14, n.17. 
193. Naluwairo, supra note 103, at 215-16. 
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the general court martial proceedings for the same acts violated the 
Uganda Constitution. 194  Nonetheless, the state still held the 
defendants at Luzira Prison.195 
Eventually, the treason trial commenced in the High Court and, 
at the same time, the government proceeded to amend the charges 
from the first general court martial proceeding.196 On November 9, 
2006, the government then commenced a second general court martial 
proceeding, also at Makindye Military Barracks. Allegedly, that 
charge sheet contained the same or similar defects to the ones from 
the prior court martial proceeding that had rendered it 
unconstitutional in the January decision by the Constitutional 
Court. 197  Moreover, this court martial proceeding charged the 
defendants with an offense not clarified in the court’s decision, which 
was not defined in 2001. Several warrants were then served on the 
Ugandan Prisons Service to deliver the defendants to the 
Constitutional Court on various days in January of 2007, but the 
defendants were never produced. Later, on March 1, the defendants 
were taken to the High Court for bail processing, but heavily armed 
security personnel again took control of the court. 198  “Scuffles” 
apparently ensued, but the defendants were not told why they were 
being re-arrested or where they would be taken. One advocate stated 
under oath, “[t]he security personnel simply insisted that they had 
                                                                                                                                           
194. Uganda Law Society v. Attorney General, 2006 UGCC 10 (Constitutional Petition 
No. 18 of 2005). This Constitutional Court case raises several interesting points about the 
concurrent jurisdiction of the High Court and the General Courts Martial. First, the Court 
indicated that the “first court siege” had contravened the Constitution and had violated the 
judiciary’s independence. Second, the Court concluded that the general courts martial and the 
High Court were equivalent courts that could both assert jurisdiction over certain acts, but to 
do so in the same case would violate the fair hearing rights in the Constitution. Third, the 
Court clarified the appellate procedures, namely that cases should be appealed from the Court 
Martial Court of Appeals to the Court of Appeal of Uganda and then to the Supreme Court. 
The Court did, however, note a contrary case that held that decisions of the Court Martial 
Court of Appeals should be appealed to the High Court (the appellate processes are not 
delineated in either of the 1995 or 2005 UPDF Acts). Finally, the Court concluded that the 
military courts could properly try civilians for firearms offenses, but that the military courts 
lacked jurisdiction to try civilians under the 2002 Anti-Terrorism Act. 
195. Naluwairo, supra note 103, at 217. 
196. Besigye & Others v. Attorney General, supra note 186. 
197. Id. 
198 . Id. This incident is referred to in the record as the “Second Court Siege.” 
Apparently, this siege also resulted in the unlawful confinement of the judges and court staff 
for over six hours. The record also indicates that Besigye was taken that day to Bushenyi (in 
western Uganda) where he was charged with murder. 
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orders not to permit the Bailed petitioners to go out on bail as ordered 
by the Court.”199 Later that same day, after the defendants had been 
turned over to the security forces, they were reportedly beaten up. 
In October of 2010 the Constitutional Court held against the 
government on multiple points in a unanimous opinion, describing the 
evidence as largely not challenged and the government’s actions as an 
affront to the Constitution.200 At this point, the court’s decision then 
proceeds with a two-page dramatic, even poetic, recitation from a 
book by another judge called “The Rape of the Temple.”201 The court 
found that the defendants had been subjected to “humiliating, cruel 
and degrading treatment” that violated the Constitution, that they had 
been deprived of a fair hearing, and that the unprecedented acts of the 
State at the High Court of Uganda had interfered with the exercise of 
judicial power in violation of the Constitution. The court then issued a 
stay of all criminal proceedings in all courts and a direction to each to 
release the defendants; the court also indicated that the court martial 
proceedings, as well as the charges in the treason and murder trials, 
were null and void. 
This case illustrates some of the difficulties faced by the 
defendants in contentious national security cases that are heard in 
Uganda’s courts. Initially, it is difficult to know whether there was 
actual merit to any of the criminal charges that were filed against Dr. 
Besigye or any of his co-defendants. What is clear is that he was 
charged in multiple courts on varying charges, at least some of which 
could not be sustained under the 1995 Constitution. Second, it appears 
that there was a significant, but probably unquantifiable, political 
component to the case. Dr. Besigye had been a former colleague of 
President Museveni, but has now accused his government of 
corruption and sought to replace him in office. Third, the government 
apparently committed numerous due process violations and which 
eventually foreclosed the government’s opportunity to have whatever 
evidence it did have heard before a neutral fact-finder. Finally, the 
security forces demonstrated a heavy-handed approach that 
demonstrates a lack of respect for the judiciary. 
                                                                                                                                           
199. Statement by Titus Kiyemba Mutale, ¶ 25; Besigye & Others v. Attorney General, 
supra note 186. 
200. Besigye & Others v. Attorney General, supra note 186. 
201. Id. 
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A further example is the terrorism case against Omar Awadh and 
ten co-defendants, based on the July 2010 bombing of the Ethiopian 
Village Restaurant in Kampala that killed at least seventy-four people 
who were watching the World Cup Finals.202 Initially, the Inspector 
General of Police formed a large investigation team to include 
members of the Ugandan Police and JATT. After the team found that 
the attack had been coordinated across several countries, to include 
Somalia, Kenya, Tanzania, and the United Kingdom, the government 
sought assistance from several foreign governments and 
organizations. The defendants were subsequently arrested outside 
Uganda and, in September of 2010, were indicted before the 
International Crimes Division on multiple counts of terrorism, 
murder, and attempted murder. The defendants then filed a petition in 
the Constitutional Court challenging, on constitutional grounds, their 
arrest, detention and transfer to Uganda, their treatment while held in 
custody by the Rapid Response Unit203 in Uganda, and the on-going 
criminal proceedings against them in the High Court (“ICD”). In part, 
the defendants alleged that they had been subjected to extraordinary 
rendition from Kenya (that is, the Kenyan Police did not have an 
arrest warrant or an extradition order), that they had been tortured in 
Kenya, and that they had been held in ungazetted locations and 
tortured in Uganda. In fact, the defendants cited the Besigye case as 
precedent for the proposition that mistreatment during detention 
warranted dismissal of the case. 
In response, the Constitutional Court made numerous important 
findings.204 First, the court did not accept the claims of illegal arrest, 
giving credit to the statements made by Ugandan Police about the 
transfer process that had taken place. Second, the court found that the 
defendants had been held in Uganda in excess of forty-eight hours 
before being brought before a magistrate, but that violation was 
                                                                                                                                           
202 . Xan Rice, Uganda bomb blasts kill at least 74, GUARDIAN (July 12, 2010), 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/jul/12/uganda-kampala-bombs-explosions-attacks; 
Omar Awadh & 10 Ors v. Attorney General, supra note 147. 
203. The Rapid Response Unit is an ad hoc security organization that, along with similar 
government organizations, has been accused of human rights abuses. Open Secret, HUM. RTS. 
WATCH, supra note 132, at 15-17. See also Violence Instead of Vigilance Torture and Illegal 
Detention by Uganda’s Rapid Response Unit, HUM. RTS WATCH (Mar. 23, 2011), 
https://www.hrw.org/report/2011/03/23/violence-instead-vigilance/torture-and-illegal-
detention-ugandas-rapid-response. 
204. Omar Awadh & 10 Ors v. Attorney General, supra note 147. 
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insufficient to grant a stay of proceedings and could be addressed by 
the trial court through appropriate compensation. Third, the court 
distinguished the Besigye case as involving serious—and largely 
undisputed—breaches of human rights by Ugandan officials, but that 
the present allegations were general due process violations that had 
been controverted by the government. Here, the court indicated that 
the trial court could consider those claims on remand and, if 
appropriate, grant similar relief to the defendants. Fourth, it 
determined that the trial court could assess circumstances in which 
confessions were made and whether coercion had been involved. 
Next, the court considered—but found moot—the defense challenge 
to the ICD itself. Essentially, the Court concluded that the ICD had 
jurisdiction to hear the case because the case was assigned to a 
division of the High Court of Uganda. Finally, the court considered 
the novel issue (for Ugandan courts) of extraordinary rendition from 
Kenya. The court made lengthy and in-depth review of the leading 
US,205 South African,206 Zimbabwean,207 and British208 cases before 
finding that the government did not violate the Constitution in 
receiving the suspects from foreign States.209  
                                                                                                                                           
205. Id. (citing Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886)); United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 
504 U.S. 655 (1992)). 
206 . Id. (citing State v. Ibrahim (1991) 2 SA 553 (holding that the court lacked 
jurisdiction to try a defendant who had been abducted from his home in Swaziland by South 
African Police)). 
207. Id. (citing Beahan v. State (1992) LRC (Crim.)). 
208. Id. (comparing Regina v. Horseferry Road Magistrate’s Court Ex Parte Bennett, 
[1994] 1 AC 42 (Eng.) (allowing an appeal where the defendant had demonstrated a level of 
collusion between the British Metropolitan and the South African Police in kidnapping an 
individual and bringing back to the UK for trial) with Regina v. Nicholas Robert Neil Mullen, 
[1999] EWCA (Crim.) 278 (Eng.) (the Court of Appeal overturned a conviction where the 
British Secret Intelligence Service “took active steps to persuade the Zimbabwe Central 
Intelligence Organization (CIO) that there existed grounds for deportation and provided 
evidence including, crucially, evidence of previous convictions, as well as draft documents 
recommending grounds for deportation,” all in an effort to evade domestic and international 
law)). 
209. Id. The court noted that any alleged illegalities occurred abroad, without any active 
Ugandan involvement, and that the Ugandan authorities did not violate any foreign states’ 
sovereignty; all actions had occurred with the full cooperation of the governments of Kenya 
and Tanzania. Thus, the court would not consider any allegations of improprieties that may 
have occurred before the suspects were transferred to the Ugandan authorities. 
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D. Traditional Acholi Reconciliation Practices: Necessary but Not 
Sufficient 
Uganda has, as part of the Juba Agreements, implemented 
various traditional reconciliation tribunals in the Acholi-populated 
areas of northern Uganda. 210  In practice, truth and reconciliation 
commissions have had a “restorative value” in bringing the former 
warring parties back together in a traditional forum—consistent with 
local cultural practice—that involves some truth telling, an 
acknowledgement of wrongdoing, and the payment of some 
compensation.211 Typically, the accused receives some level of minor 
punishment, if the local community believes that he was truthful, but 
more serious punishment if he was not. Indeed, the promotion of 
traditional cultural norms can help foster a legitimate settlement and 
peace from the viewpoint of the former belligerents and their victims. 
While Acholi reconciliation practices have helped, to some 
extent, the victimized peoples recover from the effects of war and 
return to a normal life, such practices raise several important 
problems when applied to a murderer/rapist and his victims. Some 
have argued that “[l]egal measures of impunity provided by various 
laws and constitutions under the guise of amnesties, pardons, and 
truth and reconciliation commissions are not recognized under the 
Rome Statute.” 212  On the other hand, the Rome Statute does not 
exclude traditional practices. Instead, the statute focuses on whether 
the “case is being investigated or prosecuted by a State which has 
                                                                                                                                           
210. Juba Agreements, supra note 182. See also Acirokop, supra note 138 (examining 
the challenges and opportunities for a Truth and Reconciliation Commission in addressing the 
Uganda-LRA conflict, including issues involving concurrent prosecutions, amnesty, and 
reparations). 
211. Barney Afako, Reconciliation and Justice: ‘Mato Oput’ and the Amnesty Act, 
Accord Northern Uganda, Conciliation Resources, 64 Accord 11 64-67, (200), http://www.c-
r.org/downloads/Accord%2011_13Reconciliation%20and%20justice_2002_ENG.pdf. The 
mato oput (the “drinking of the bitter root”) is a traditional practice that has been used to 
address situations in which someone has been killed, either accidentally or intentionally. In 
addition, ICC Prosecutor Louis Moreno-Ocampo has accepted that traditional mechanisms can 
work together with prosecutions, but has not been willing to accept such an alternative for the 
five persons then under ICC indictment. See also Alexander K.A. Greenawalt, 
Complementarity in Crisis: Uganda, Alternative Justice, and the International Criminal Court, 
50 VA. J. INT’L. L. 108, 143 (2009) (citing a 2007 interview Moreno-Ocampo gave to THE 
NEW VISION (Kampala)). 
212. Betty Kaari Murungi, Implementing the International Criminal Court Statute in 
Africa: Some Reflections, 7 E. AFRICAN J. OF PEACE & HUM. RTS 136, 140 (2001). 
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jurisdiction over, unless the State is unwilling or unable genuinely to 
carry out the investigation or prosecution.”213 This language does not 
mandate a western-style criminal law proceeding; it is ambiguous 
language that allows for wide latitude in state-level discretion in 
whether to prosecute (what the evidence supports), the forum 
selected, the processes, and in the post-trial punishments that are 
meted out. Arguably, if Uganda were to apply amnesty or 
reconciliation practices, with minor punishments or bare reparations, 
to a senior LRA officer who had “command responsibility” and who 
had directed the activities of others, the ICC could infer that Uganda 
was “unwilling” to carry out a genuine investigation and/or 
proceeding. 
A tiered process could address this issue.214 The more senior and 
more culpable LRA officers who were responsible for planning and 
directing large-scale offenses should be held accountable in more 
stringent proceedings, either involving the ICD or an international 
tribunal, that carry heavier punishments. Truth and reconciliation 
practices are probably better restricted to the more numerous and less 
culpable LRA “soldiers” and family members who carried out the 
orders of more senior officers, especially if their crimes were 
committed as children shortly after abduction or while under 
coercion.215 In that sense, a truth and reconciliation commission could 
serve several important Acholi interests; it helps reunite missing 
children with their families, helping both the family to understand 
what happened and the former child soldier to reintegrate into his 
community. It could dispense with more formal legal proceedings 
                                                                                                                                           
213.  Rome Statute, supra note 14, art. 17(1)(a). 
214 . See Michael A. Newton, A Synthesis of Community Based Justice and 
Complementarity 35 (VAND. U. L. SCH., Working Paper No. 12-22, 2015) (arguing the 
International Criminal Court should “develop a framework for understanding community-
based mechanisms in light of the ‘interests of justice’ analysis under [Rome Statute] Article 
53”). In other words, the Court cannot simply impose its own preferences and override local 
alternative justice mechanisms. 
215 . See also Abdul Tejan-Cole, The Special Court for Sierra Leone: Conceptual 
Concerns and Alternatives, 1 AFRICAN HUM. RTS  L. J. 107, 117-18 (2001) (explaining the 
moral dilemmas involved in prosecuting child combatants before the then proposed Special 
Court for Sierra Leone and suggesting alternatives such as truth and reconciliation 
commissions with rehabilitative efforts or trials that do not result in a custodial sentence). No 
child was actually tried before the Special Court, as its statutory mandate was to try those 
“most responsible” for the offenses suffered. That limited the Court’s jurisdiction to 
executives, not executors. 
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involving both time and expense for people who are less morally 
culpable. 
E. Assessment: Willing, But Unable without Support 
Uganda has clearly evidenced a willingness to address the 
culpability of LRA members through diverse legal instruments, to 
include prosecution before its courts, amnesty within certain bounds, 
and traditional reconciliation practices. Each instrument has potential 
value, if one examines the culpability of the person concerned and the 
adequacy of the relevant processes. Nonetheless, the Ugandan 
judiciary may be unable to prosecute the complex criminal cases 
involving war crimes and crimes against humanity against senior 
LRA leaders without significant outside support. Uganda has 
lingering problems with its judiciary, with the applicable criminal 
statutes, and in its administration of justice. 
Uganda has an effective civilian judicial structure, to include 
new legal instruments and institutions (e.g., the ICD), with a judiciary 
that is developing the requisite expertise to handle such cases. Still, 
the judiciary has been plagued by problems with staffing, insufficient 
resources, allegations of corruption, and periodic political 
interference. Uganda lacks a witness protection program.216 On one 
hand, it would be a challenge to hold high profile LRA trials in a 
location where witnesses and the public could view the proceedings, 
without excessive interference from the Ugandan security services. 
On the other hand, it would also be a challenge to try cases against 
government officials and UPDF members without outside 
interference and threats against court personnel and witnesses. This 
raises concerns about the supremacy of the law and accountability in 
Uganda. 
Uganda has at least three important statutes that could be applied 
to many, if not most offenses committed by the senior LRA leaders. 
The leaders could be charged under the Penal Code of 1950, the 
Geneva Conventions Act of 1964, or the UPDF Acts (for arms and 
uniform violations only). While Uganda has passed several further 
statutes that would be effective against terrorists and terror groups, to 
include the 2002 Anti-Terrorism Statute, the 2010 ICC Act, and the 
                                                                                                                                           
216. Memorandum from Gadeir Abbas, The Public International Law Group (Nov. 23, 
2008) (on file with author). 
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2012 Prevention and Prohibition of Torture Act, the application of 
these statutes to many of the offenses committed by the LRA leaders 
would raise problems involving the prohibition against retroactive 
criminal laws under the Ugandan Constitution.217 Still, many persons 
could be charged under the treason, terrorism, murder, and rape 
articles of the 1950 Penal Code, especially since the “grave breaches” 
sections of the 1964 Geneva Conventions Act probably do not apply 
to this conflict. 
Uganda has several issues with its administration of justice, 
raising concerns that a defendant might not receive a fair trial. First, 
Uganda should reconsider its use of the treason and misprision of 
treason articles in its 1950 Penal Code. Both articles raise concerns, if 
not on the statutory language itself, at least as applied to certain 
defendants. The DPP should demand a timely and effective 
investigation by the Ugandan Police before proceeding to indict or 
prosecute a defendant. Treason charges should never be a cudgel to 
use against political opponents. Second, Uganda should repeal those 
sections of the UPDF Act that permit the court martial of civilians for 
offenses such as the illegal possession of weapons and uniforms. 
Civilians should not be subject to criminal trials in military courts, 
much less be faced with simultaneous prosecutions in military and 
civilian courts, at least absent truly unusual circumstances. In any 
case, there are serious questions about whether an accused person can 
receive a fair trial in a court martial and whether that court functions 
independent of the chain of command. Third, Uganda should amend 
the Amnesty Act to make clear whether the protections offered are a 
discretionary grant, or if their receipt is automatic once certain 
qualification criteria are met. This would help avoid situations like 
that of LRA Major General Acellam where there was a three-year 
delay in making this decision, with much political controversy in the 
interim. 
Finally, and probably most important, there should be a stricter 
separation between the executive branch and the judiciary. This 
should be a cooperative relationship, with strict compliance with the 
rule of law. Moreover, the Ugandan Parliament should establish 
                                                                                                                                           
217. There are, however, several views on whether the ICC Act could have retroactive 
application to LRA members. Nouwen, supra note 145, at 15-17 (making a distinction 
between ‘act’ and ‘offence,’ but noting that this issue should be addressed using constitutional 
procedures, first in Parliament and then in the courts). 
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greater oversight over the executive services and agencies conducting 
law enforcement investigations; each service and agency should have 
clear authorities and limitations. This should help reduce overlap and 
improve effectiveness, and should help prevent human rights abuses. 
Ugandan judges require dedicated, qualified staff, not subject to 
periodic rotation between different departments. In any case, while 
Uganda may be currently unable to try complex, contentious cases, 
outside assistance could help Uganda develop this capability. 
V. ACCOUNTABILITY UNDER INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 
A. Introduction: Addressing the Scope of the Conflict 
Uganda has several alternative means of proceeding against 
Kony, his senior officers, and other members of his group, and each 
approach has its own advantages and liabilities. First, the direct 
prosecution under the national penal code offers wide coverage, at the 
cost of a large number of defendants and a significant burden on the 
judicial system. LRA members could be prosecuted under the Uganda 
Penal Code for a range of ordinary crimes, to include treason, 
misprision of treason, murder, kidnapping, assault, theft, defilement 
of a girl under age eighteen, and rape, as well as arms and uniform 
offenses under the 1992 and 1995 UPDF Acts. The Ugandan courts of 
judicature have considerable experience in prosecuting and 
sentencing defendants, although not at the scale and breadth seen in 
the Uganda-LRA conflict. Such prosecutions could reach the entire 
range of offenses committed by Kony and his associates with no ex 
post facto problems. Second, the use of the ICC reduces the number 
of offenses, especially since the Rome Statute only reaches offenses 
committed after July 2002, while reducing the load on the national 
courts. Third, Uganda could consider a new alternative, one involving 
a combined ICC-Uganda tribunal that could assist with the further 
development of the Ugandan courts as a fair and impartial court with 
the capacity to address complex cases. A combined tribunal could 
limit the number of cases if the agreement limits jurisdiction, but if 
not, the tribunal could simply augment the ability of the existing court 
system to handle the increased number of cases. Each approach has 
political and legal advantages, disadvantages, and costs. 
The ICC has undoubtedly had a salutary effect on the 
administration of justice in Uganda over the past ten years. There is 
ample evidence that the outstanding indictments against Kony and his 
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senior leaders have caused Museveni’s government to adopt a range 
of new legal instruments (e.g., the 2010 ICC Act and the 2012 
Prevention and Prohibition of Torture Act) and to create new 
institutions (e.g., the ICD) that could provide some level of 
“complementarity” in Uganda law and allow the government to 
sidestep the ICC itself. While such a result might persuade some 
senior LRA leaders to surrender, it also raises questions about the 
adequacy of Ugandan law and its commitment to accountability. In 
any case, President Museveni—despite some misgivings—has 
accepted the fact that the ICC will now be proceeding with the case 
against Dominic Ongwen.218 This leads to the question whether the 
ICC itself is the appropriate forum for addressing the range of 
depredations committed over the course of this conflict. For a number 
of reasons, it is not. 
The ICC lacks the temporal and subject matter jurisdiction to 
cover the scope of offenses committed by either the LRA or the 
UPDF over the course of the entire conflict. First, the ICC lacks 
temporal jurisdiction for any crimes committed before July 1, 2002. 
This means that the court could not prosecute Kony, Odhiambo, or 
Ongwen for the full range of offenses for the prior ten to fifteen-year 
period when the LRA operated with impunity over much of northern 
Uganda and southern Sudan, terrorizing, mutilating, killing, 
abducting, and raping tens of thousands of innocent people. Second, 
the court’s jurisdiction is narrowly focused on genocide, crimes 
against humanity, war crimes, and the crime of aggression,219 and 
Kony and his co-defendants have been charged with only crimes 
against humanity and war crimes. 220  Yet, the defendants can be 
prosecuted for a much broader range of acts under the Uganda Penal 
                                                                                                                                           
218 . Compare Frederic Musisi, Museveni to ICC: We are on Same Side, DAILY 
MONITOR (Kampala) (Mar. 4, 2015), http://www.monitor.co.ug/News/National/Museveni-to-
ICC--We-are-on-same-side/-/688334/2641672/-/85qqoy/-/index.html, with Museveni Turns 
from ICC Admirer to Critic, OBSERVER (Kampala) (June 9, 2013), http://observer.ug/com  
ponent/content/article?id=25783:museveni-turns-from-icc-admirer-to-critic. Kofi Annan, the 
Secretary General from 1997-2006, recognized that many Africans feel targeted by the ICC, 
but that the concern was misplaced. As he “tried to make clear at the 2010 review conference 
in Kampala, which added a definition of aggression to the statute, the ICC is simply needed 
more in Africa because of the weaknesses of its judicial systems. As these systems strengthen, 
there will be less need for the ICC.” KOFI ANNAN, INTERVENTIONS: A LIFE IN WAR AND 
PEACE 154 (2012). 
219. See Rome Statute, supra note 14. 
220. See Prosecutor v. Kony, supra note 31. 
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Code to include treason, rape, kidnapping, terrorism, illegal 
possession of weapons and equipment, and inciting violence that 
would go unprosecuted if the ICC is the court-of-choice.221 Ugandan 
courts can prosecute the full range of acts, whether committed in 
Uganda or neighboring countries.222 
To balance properly the strengths and weaknesses of both the 
national courts and an ICC prosecution, the ICC should adopt a 
bilateral approach, combining lessons learned from both the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (“ICTR”) and the Special 
Court for Sierra Leone (“SCSL”). The ICC should establish a bilateral 
ICC-Uganda tribunal, perhaps in Arusha, Tanzania, but based upon 
Ugandan criminal law and appellate processes. The ICC should 
establish this tribunal through an international agreement (treaty) with 
Uganda which provides the court with the subject matter, temporal, 
and in personam jurisdiction for all criminal acts, war crimes, and 
crimes against humanity from January 1, 1990 to the present and 
continuing. This tribunal should have jurisdiction over offenses 
committed by either the LRA or the UPDF/Ugandan Police, 
committed in Uganda, southern Sudan, the DRC, or the CAR. Such 
an approach can make effective use of the pre-trial work completed 
by the ICC and its investigators over the past years, while promoting 
the rule of law in Uganda and furthering the work of the ICC to 
ensure accountability for persons culpable of serious crimes against 
international law. In any event, the treaty should name the persons 
who will be tried by this tribunal and explicitly recognize Uganda’s 
right to grant amnesty or prosecute any other LRA defendants.223 In 
                                                                                                                                           
221. See generally Penal Code Act, supra note 8. 
222. Uganda has a limited ability to assert personal jurisdiction over crimes committed 
in southern Sudan, the DRC, and the CAR. Compare the Penal Code Act, supra note 8, Article 
4 (granting extra-territorial jurisdiction for only certain offenses) and Article 5 (granting extra-
territorial jurisdiction for acts partly within and without Uganda), with The Geneva 
Conventions Act 1964, supra note 97 (providing for more expansive extra-territorial 
application for grave breaches). 
223. The Constitution of Uganda recognizes the common law right to the writ of habeas 
corpus; the writ provides amnestied persons with a means for challenging subsequent criminal 
proceedings for those same acts. CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA, supra note 87, 
art. 23, § 9. Since there is a potential for a conflict between domestic and international law on 
the validity of amnesty as a bar to subsequent prosecution for violations of international 
humanitarian law, this issue should be explicitly addressed in any ICC-Ugandan agreement. 
While the agreement should name the defendants who would be tried by this combined 
tribunal, the agreement should also allow the parties to add after-discovered malefactors. The 
2015 decision of the Constitutional Court in Kwoyelo case suggests that the application of the 
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overall terms, this approach would legitimize the role and work of the 
ICC to date, both in the international community and Uganda, and 
would facilitate capacity-building in the Uganda judiciary. 224  This 
approach would serve the object and purpose of the Rome Statute 
itself; this court would help end the impunity for the perpetrators of 
serious crimes and contribute to the prevention of such crimes 
through effective national prosecutions.225 
This recommended approach also requires a policy decision 
from Uganda. In a certain sense, there is a political advantage in 
proceeding with the prosecutions in the ICC. On one hand, Museveni 
made the first state referral to the ICC and there could be international 
political costs associated with trying to withdraw that action—
especially since there is no provision in the Rome Statute that 
addresses the issue. For domestic political reasons, Museveni may 
also prefer that the ICC carry the burden of prosecuting a sensitive 
case that could well cause many people to question his own 
government’s conduct over that same period of time. On the other 
hand, Uganda made the referral over ten years ago and there have 
since been many positive, material developments in Uganda’s 
administration of justice. Museveni may prefer a combined tribunal 
that increases the involvement of Africans in ICC prosecutions and 
showcases his government’s ability to address the issues. Finally, 
while Uganda may choose—consistent with the ICCPR—to apply the 
death penalty to a range of ordinary criminal offenses under its own 
law,226 it would undoubtedly have to agree to its non-application to 
any cases withdrawn from the ICC. 
B. The Rome Statute and the International Criminal Court 
The ICC, with its founding Rome Statute, has offered a major 
advance in international criminal law, permitting the international 
community to move forward from the ad hoc tribunals that were 
                                                                                                                                           
combatant’s privilege to this conflict would provide a useful means for addressing this 
possible conflict of laws, while still allowing prosecution for serious violations of international 
humanitarian law. See Uganda v. Kwoyelo, 2015 UGSC 5 (Const. App. No. 01 of 2012). 
224. See Uganda v. Kwoyelo, 2015 UGSC 5 (Const. App. No. 01 of 2012). 
225. See Rome Statute, supra note 14, pmbl. 
226. Compare ICCPR, supra note 8 (permitting the application of the death penalty), 
with the Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
supra note 8 (seeking to outlaw that penalty). 
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formed to provide justice and accountability for the atrocities 
committed in a particular conflict. 227  While the international 
community has formed various tribunals since the end of World War 
II, the tribunals have been subjected to a range of criticisms as “a 
victor’s justice,”228 as lacking of body of consistent and acceptable 
jurisprudence, or as requiring lengthy negotiations with political 
compromises. In that sense, the ICC has offered an opportunity to 
overcome “tribunal fatigue”229 with a permanent court that offers a 
neutral forum that can adjudicate well-defined and serious offenses 
through established practices and procedures. Indeed, the Preamble 
recognizes that “grave crimes threaten the peace, security and well-
being of the world,” and notes that the most serious crimes should not 
go unpunished and that effective prosecution must be ensured.230 The 
Rome Statute entered into force on July 1, 2002. Clearly, the ICC has 
important features that limit its ability to address the Uganda-LRA 
conflict. 
The ICC is a permanent institution with “international legal 
personality.”231 It was established at the Hague and has the authority 
to “sit elsewhere, whenever it considers it desirable.”232 Indeed, this 
article likely provides the ICC with legal authority to enter into some 
bilateral agreements, not otherwise inconsistent with the Statute, with 
a state party regarding the investigation and prosecution of cases that 
                                                                                                                                           
227. See RICHARD J. GOLDSTONE AND ADAM M. SMITH, INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL 
INSTITUTIONS 129-33 (Thomas G. Weiss & Rorden Wilkinson eds., Routledge 2009). 
228. Id. at 3. In one important respect, that involving the definition of certain crimes 
against the international community, the ICC and its founding Rome Statute offers a major 
advance in international criminal law. Indeed, one criticism going back the Nuremberg trials 
was that, consistent with the ex post facto principle, individuals should not be held criminally 
liable for certain acts that had not been previously proscribed. See TELFORD TAYLOR, THE 
ANATOMY OF THE NUREMBERG TRIALS 580-83 (1992). 
229. DAVID SCHEFFER, ALL THE MISSING SOULS: A PERSONAL HISTORY OF THE WAR 
CRIMES TRIBUNALS 168 (2012). 
230. Rome Statute, supra note 14, pmbl. 
231. Id. art. 4(1), provides: “The Court shall have international legal personality. It shall 
also have such legal capacity as may be necessary for the exercise of its functions and the 
fulfilment of its purposes.” Indeed, the bilateral international agreement between the UN and 
the Government of Sierra Leone provides a certain precedent for a treaty between an 
international organization and a sovereign government. See generally Agreement between the 
United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone and Statute of the Special Court for Sierra 
Leone, Jan. 16, 2002, 2178 U.N.T.S. 138. 
232. Rome Statute, supra note 14, art. 3(3). 
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would otherwise be within its jurisdiction.233 The Rome Statute gives 
the Court jurisdiction “for the most serious crimes of international 
concern, as referred to in this Statute, and shall be complementary to 
national criminal jurisdiction.”234 The Statute recognizes this principle 
of “complementarity,” the principle that a State’s domestic courts are 
accorded primary jurisdiction for prosecuting individuals, unless the 
ICC determines that the State is “unwilling or unable genuinely to 
carry out the prosecution.”235 The Statute gives the court jurisdiction 
over just four crimes: the crime of genocide, crimes against humanity, 
war crimes, and the crime of aggression.236 The Statute limits the 
range of applicable punishments to a term of years, not to exceed a 
maximum thirty, or life imprisonment; the Statute excludes the 
application of the death penalty.237 
This structured approach offers several important advantages for 
criminal prosecutions. First, it concentrates international attention and 
resources on the persons responsible for the most serious and 
politically sensitive international offenses. This permits the court to 
develop the body of law that will be most useful to the international 
community. Second, it encourages States to investigate and prosecute 
offenses wherever possible. This facilitates improved state capacity 
by encouraging States to handle cases through its own systems and 
processes, avoiding international involvement. In short, a State can 
know that if investigates and prosecutes cases in a good faith manner 
it can avoid excessive international attention. Third, the 
complementarity principle does not dictate any standards for the 
investigation, prosecution and sentencing of culpable persons; the 
Statute gives States great flexibility in their administration of justice. 
                                                                                                                                           
233. Id. arts. 4(1)-(2). On the other hand, if the proposed agreement were considered a 
significant departure from the Court’s authorities under the Rome Statute, it might be obligated 
to seek an amendment to the statute through an Assembly of States Parties or at a Review 
Conference.  See id. art. 121(3). 
234. Id. art. 1. 
235 . See id. art. 17(1)(a); William W. Burke-White and Scott Kaplan, Shaping the 
Contours of Domestic Justice: The International Criminal Court and an Admissibility 
Challenge in the Uganda Situation, U. PA. L. SCH. PUB. L. & LEGAL THEORY RES. PAPER 
SERIES, Res. Paper No. 08-13, at 38 (reviewing the legal basis for a possible Ugandan 
challenge to admissibility to include issues involving state referrals). Indeed, one object and 
purpose of the Rome Statute “is to create a court of complementary jurisdiction that 
preferences national prosecutions where they are possible.”  
236. Rome Statute, supra note 14, art. 5.  
237. See id. art. 77(1). 
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Here, Kony, Vincent Otti, Okot Odhiambo, Raska Lakwena, and 
Dominic Ongwen were indicted by the ICC with crimes against 
humanity and war crimes.238 In terms of crimes against humanity, the 
LRA could undoubtedly be charged with acts of murder, enslavement, 
torture, and rape “as part of a systematic attack directed against any 
civilian population, with knowledge of the attack.”239 In terms of war 
crimes, the LRA can be charged with “grave breaches” of the 1949 
Geneva Conventions—if certain parts of the conflict were determined 
to be international in nature,240 serious violations of the “laws and 
customs applicable in international armed conflict,” 241  or other 
specified offenses in armed conflicts “not of an international 
character.”242 While Article 8(2)(c) tracks the language of Common 
Article 3 from the 1949 Geneva Conventions, Article 8(2)(e) expands 
the list of offenses to proscribe “directing attacks against the civilian 
population as such or against individual civilians not taking direct part 
in hostilities”; attacks against activities and personnel using the 
distinctive emblems of the Geneva Conventions; attacks against 
activities and personnel involved in a “humanitarian assistance or 
peacekeeping missions in accordance with the Charter of the United 
Nations” 243; intentionally directing attacks against certain protected 
places244; and “conscripting or enlisting children under the age of 
fifteen years into the armed forces or groups or using them to 
participate actively in hostilities.” There is little doubt that Kony has 
committed a range of acts that could be construed as criminal offenses 
under either the Ugandan Penal Code or the Rome Statute. 
                                                                                                                                           
238 . See generally  Prosecutor v. Kony, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/05-53, Warrant of 
Arrest for Joseph Kony Issued on 8 July 2005 as Amended on 7 September 2005 (Sept. 27, 
2005); Prosecutor v. Kony, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/05-54, Warrant of Arrest for Vincent Otti 
(July 8, 2005); Prosecutor v. Kony, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/05-7, Warrant of Arrest for Raska 
Lakwena Issued (July 8, 2005); Prosecutor v. Kony, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/05/56, Warrant of 
Arrest for Okot Odhiambo (July 8, 2005); Prosecutor v. Kony, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/05-57, 
Warrant of Arrest for Dominic Ongwen (July 8, 2005). 
239. Rome Statute, supra note 14, art. 7(1). 
240. Id. art. 8(2)(a). 
241. Id. art. 8(2)(b). 
242. Id. art. 8(2)(c). 
243. Id. art. 8(2)(e)(iii). See e.g., Armed Group Kills 8 UN Peacekeepers in Garamba 
Park, supra note 71 (reporting an armed group killing eight UN peacekeepers during an 
ambush in the Congo). 
244.  Id. art. 8(2)(e)(iv). See Poaching Onslaught in Garamba National Park, supra note 
43. 
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The court has already completed many important actions since 
Uganda made its state referral in December of 2003. The court has 
completed extensive field work, both investigating the offenses and in 
educating the affected populations about its work.245 The court has 
issued and then unsealed arrest warrants, ordered the submission of 
additional information,246 initiated proceedings under Article 19 (a 
challenge to admissibility) 247  and the appointment of defense 
counsel,248 decided issues involving the participation of victims in the 
case,249 severed the proceedings against Ongwen, and set that matter 
for trial.250 
In March of 2008, the Pre-Trial Chamber initiated proceedings 
under Article 19(1), appointing an attorney for the defense for 
purposes of the proceedings and inviting the parties “to submit their 
observations on the Admissibility to the Case.”251 At this point, the 
defense raised questions about the propriety of the proceedings, as 
well as its representation of the defendants, who were still at large and 
                                                                                                                                           
245. See Rep. of the Int’l Criminal Court to the UN Gen. Assembly, Oct. 17, 2006, ICC-
ASP/5/15 [hereinafter Rep. of the ICC]. 
246. Prosecutor v. Kony, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/05-131, Order to the Prosecutor for the 
Submission of Additional Information on the Status of the Execution of the Warrants of Arrest 
in the Situation in Uganda (Nov. 30, 2006). 
247. Prosecutor v. Kony, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/05-377, Decision on the admissibility 
of the case under Article 19(1) of the Statute (Mar. 10, 2009). 
248 . Prosecutor v. Kony, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/05-320, Decision Initiating 
Proceedings Under Article 19, Requesting Observations and Appointing Counsel for the 
Defense (Oct. 21, 2008). 
249 . Prosecutor v. Kony, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/05-324 OA2, Decision on the 
Participation of Victims in the Appeal (Oct. 27, 2008) (addressing issues relating to the status 
of victims and the right to participate in the proceedings). 
250 . Prosecutor v. Kony, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/05, Decision Severing the Case 
Against Dominic Ongwen (Feb. 6, 2015) (noting that severance was appropriate given that 
“there is no real prospect that the other suspects will appear nor certainty that they will be 
apprehended in the near future,” and that the present case—against a defendant who 
voluntarily appeared in court —should not be delayed). See also Wolfgang Schomburg, The 
Role of International Criminal Tribunals in Promoting Respect for Fair Trial Rights, 8 NW. J. 
INT’L HUM. RTS. 1, 13-15 (2009) (discussing issues relating to the right to be tried without 
undue delay under the ICCPR and before international criminal tribunals). 
251. Prosecutor v. Kony, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/05-408, Decision on the Admissibility 
of the Case Under Article 19(1) of the Statute (Mar. 10, 2009). Under Article 19(1), the “Court 
shall satisfy itself that it has jurisdiction in any case brought before it. The Court may, on its 
own motion, determine the admissibility of a case in accordance with article 17.” Rome 
Statute, supra note 14, art. 19(1). 
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unable to participate in the matter.252 The Government of Uganda 
regarded the case as admissible.253 The Office of Public Counsel for 
the Victims (“OPCV”) argued that the proceedings were premature, 
indicating that it would be difficult to assess Uganda’s “willingness” 
to proceed against the defendants given the pending peace agreement 
and the creation of the planned legal/judicial machinery. 254  In its 
March of 2009 decision on the admissibility of the case, the Pre-Trial 
Chamber II made several important findings, to include the fact that 
the defendants, as well as other parties, would have the right to raise 
admissibility challenges at later dates.255 While the Chamber noted 
the pending peace agreement, with the implementation provisions, it 
held “that it would be premature and therefore inappropriate to assess 
the features envisaged for the Special Division and its legal 
framework.” 256  This initial decision on admissibility was then 
appealed by the defense and the matter was decided by the Appeals 
Chamber.257 
The ICC has two important articles that bear on the admissibility 
of a case. Initially, Article 17 creates complementarity rules for the 
admissibility of a case before the court and Article 53 allows the 
prosecutor to reconsider admissibility after initiating an investigation 
and prosecution. Article 17 does not impose specific legal 
requirements on Uganda; instead, it focuses on a State’s “willingness” 
to try a particular case, suggesting that a State could make good faith 
determinations on whether and to what extent a particular person 
                                                                                                                                           
252. See Prosecutor v. Kony, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/05, Decision on the Admissibility 
of the Case Under Article 19(1) of the Statute (Mar. 10, 2009), at para. 6-7. 
253. See id. para. 8. 
254. Id. para. 9. 
255. Id. para. 25-29 (citing the Rome Statute, supra note 14, Articles 18(7) and 19(2). 
Indeed, Article 18(7) envisions that Uganda could, later, challenge the admissibility of the case 
“on the grounds of additional significant facts or significant change in circumstances.” Rome 
Statute, supra note 14, at Article 18(7). 
256. Prosecutor v. Kony, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/05-408, Decision on the Admissibility 
of the Case Under Article 19(1) of the Statute (Mar. 10, 2009), at para. 51. 
257. Prosecutor v. Kony, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/05 OA 3, Judgment on the Appeal of 
the Defense against the “Decision on the admissibility of the case under Article 19(1) of the 
Statute” (Sept. 16, 2009), https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/ CR2009_06675.PDF. The 
Court noted that the role of defense counsel is limited at this stage in the proceedings and 
“must be understood differently from the mandate of defense counsel who has been appointed 
to represent a person as an individual.” Id. para. 1. 
2017] THE QUEST FOR JUSTICE: KONY & THE LRA 315 
should be tried for certain offenses and not others.258 Article 53(4) 
provides: “The Prosecutor may, at any time, reconsider a decision 
whether to initiate an investigation or prosecution based on new facts 
or information.”259 Thus, while it may be have been true that Uganda 
could not have previously investigated the LRA cases because of 
shortcomings in the Ugandan Police and with JATT or could not have 
prosecuted the cases based on the lack of an adequate (specialized) 
court, the ICC is now in a position to reconsider the original 
admissibility decision and consider a new approach that might offer 
better prospects for accountability under both international 
humanitarian and Ugandan law. In short, the existence and activity of 
the ICC to date is not an ipso facto bar to the creation of a combined 
tribunal. 
There are important findings that can be made with the ICC’s 
current approach to the prosecution of senior LRA officers. First, as 
noted earlier, the ICC’s limited temporal and subject matter 
jurisdiction is insufficient to address the totality of acts committed by 
the LRA. Second, the court has completed exemplary work in 
investigating the cases and initiating the proceedings against the most 
culpable LRA leaders. 260  It is unlikely that Uganda could have 
achieved such commendable results over the same period of time. 
Third, while it was undoubtedly once true that Uganda was 
“unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or 
prosecution,” 261  that is no longer the situation and the ICC can 
reconsider its decision on admissibility and pursue an alternative 
approach that would better serve the ends of justice. 
                                                                                                                                           
258. See Abbas, supra note 216, at 25. In fact, even though the Rome Statute does not 
permit the imposition of the death penalty, Uganda would not necessarily have to repeal its 
death penalty provision because the ICCPR recognizes that it should be limited to the “most 
serious crimes.” Compare Rome Statute, supra note 14, art. 77 (1) (limiting sentencing to a 
term of years, not to exceed a maximum of 30, or “a term of life imprisonment when justified 
by the extreme gravity of the crime and the individual circumstances of the convicted 
person”), with the ICCPR, supra note 8, art. 6(2). 
259. Rome Statute, supra note 14, art. 53(4). 
260. See, e.g., Rep. of the ICC, supra note 245. 
261. Rome Statute, supra note 14, art. 17(1). 
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C. Alternative International Approaches in Constituting an ICC 
Proceeding 
The ICTR, constituted by the UN Security Council under its 
Chapter VII enforcement authority (threats to peace), and the SCSL, 
created by a bilateral international agreement between the United 
Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone (“GoSL”), offer two 
different models for the creation of a hybrid international tribunal. 
Each approach has its merits, depending upon the willingness of the 
host nation to support the investigation and prosecution of a case, the 
capacity of the host nation’s judicial institutions, available funding, 
and the need to provide accountability under both international 
humanitarian and domestic law. Each approach also has its 
advantages as compared to prosecution by the ICC. On one hand, the 
ICC, as it sits at the Hague, can contribute to the development of a 
coherent body of international criminal law, and move the 
international community away from earlier ad hoc tribunals. On the 
other hand, the ICC—at least as applied to the Uganda-LRA 
conflict—can leave an impunity gap with the defendants not held 
accountable for some offenses. The existence of such a gap can bring 
about a loss of legitimacy and cannot contribute to developing 
national state capacity. All said, a mixed tribunal under ICC 
leadership, as suggested by the Sierra Leone experience, offers the 
ICC and Uganda a viable means of achieving justice through 
enhanced accountability. 
The 1994 genocide had a devastating impact on Rwanda. It has 
been estimated that over 800,000 people, largely Tutsi in ethnicity, 
were killed in a hundred-day spree of popular rampage, all in a 
country that had a pre-genocide population of an estimated seven to 
eight million. 262  This genocide was planned and executed by 
government leaders, with participation at all levels of society, often 
with neighbor killing, mutilating, raping, and/or robbing neighbor.263 
This genocide also eviscerated the Rwandan justice system, leaving 
                                                                                                                                           
262. Mark A. Drumbl, Law and Atrocity: Settling Accounts in Rwanda, 31 OHIO N. U. L. 
REV. 41, 42-43 (2005) (reviewing the history of the genocide and explaining how post-
genocide trials occurred at three different levels). 
263. Hollie Nyseth Brehm et al., Genocide, Justice, and Rwanda’s Gacaca Courts, 30(3) 
J. CONTEMP. CRIM. JUST. 333, 334 (2014). See also PAUL J. MAGNARELLA, JUSTICE IN 
AFRICA: RWANDA’S GENOCIDE, ITS COURTS AND THE UN CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL 19-22 
(2000). 
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the new government led by Paul Kagame’s Rwandan Patriotic Army 
(“RPA,” later renamed the Rwandan Defense Forces) with 
overwhelming problems in searching for, incarcerating and 
imprisoning an estimated one million perpetrators.264 This situation 
led the new Rwandan government to request international assistance 
in the form of a tribunal to try the persons most culpable for the 
genocide, and to initiate national trials for the next most culpable 
group and the local Gacaca courts for the bulk of the participants.265 
The ICTR was established by the UN Security Council under its 
Chapter VII authority of the UN Charter based upon a request from 
the Government of Rwanda.266 The UN Security Council created this 
tribunal with subject matter jurisdiction for “serious violations of 
international humanitarian law committed in the territory of Rwanda 
and Rwandan citizens responsible for such violations committed in 
the territory of neighboring states, between 1 January 1994 and 31 
December 1994.”267 The Statute then proceeds to define three crimes 
that would be before the court: genocide, crimes against humanity, 
and violations of Common Article 3 and of Additional Protocol II.268 
The Statute also provides for concurrent jurisdiction between the 
ICTR and Rwandan national courts, with the ICTR having primacy 
over national courts.269 While the Statute does not exclude Rwandan 
judges, it provides that judges shall be elected by the General 
Assembly from a list provided by the Security Council.270 Clearly, 
this court was created with limited subject matter, personal, and 
temporal jurisdiction focused on the most culpable perpetrators while 
allowing Rwanda to prosecute a larger class of defendants. The ICTR 
                                                                                                                                           
264. See Brehm, supra note 263, at 334-35. 
265. See Drumbl, supra note 262, at 44-48. 
266. S.C. Res. 955 (Nov. 1994).  
267. Id. UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS OFFICE OF THE COMMISSIONER, STATUTE OF 
THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA, art. 1, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Professional  
Interest/Pages/StatuteInternationalCriminalTribunalForRwanda.aspx [hereinafter International 
Tribunal Statute]. Some Rwandans have criticized the limited temporal jurisdiction, arguing 
that the ICTR should have examined a broader span of time to include the period 1990-94. See 
also Drumbl, supra note 262, at 46, n.22; Nigel Eltringham, A Legacy Deferred?: The 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda at 20 Years, E-International Relations (Apr. 29, 
2014), http://www.e-ir.info/2014/04/29/a-legacy-deferred-the-international-criminal-tribunal-
for-rwanda-at-20-years/. 
268. International Tribunal Statute, supra note 267, at arts. 2-4. 
269. Id. art. 8. 
270. Id. art.12(3). 
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has achieved commendable results with annual reporting on its 
progress271 and has recently reported that it anticipates closing its 
doors by the end of 2015.272 
While there are merits to the approach taken by the UN Security 
Council, especially in providing outside expertise and resources, this 
approach has also caused some level of discord and alienation 
between Rwanda and the ICTR.273 The UN approach has excluded 
Rwandans from the bench and court staff, and its distance between 
Rwanda and Arusha has made it difficult for many Rwandans to 
attend or even follow the proceedings.274 The Rwandan government 
has dissented from the ICTR’s inability to impose the death penalty 
on the most culpable persons, while it has imposed capital 
punishment in its national level trials, and has also opposed any 
suggestion that the ICTR might prosecute members of the RPA for 
any abuses that may have occurred in ousting the former regime.275 
Unlike the ICTR, there is some evidence that the Gacaca courts, 
“which primarily operate at the local level, may inherit greater 
legitimacy among local audiences than national or international 
courts.” 276  This is no doubt true because local people have an 
opportunity to see and participate in proceedings that concern them, 
their friends, and their neighbors. Victims and their families can learn 
about what happened and see some level of justice exacted, whether it 
is in the form of prison terms, community service, or reparations.277 
Sierra Leone experienced a devastating civil war that lasted from 
March 1991 to January 2002 which started when Charles Taylor sent 
his forces into Sierra Leone from neighboring Liberia.278 This civil 
war was waged by several organized armed groups that committed 
serious breaches of international humanitarian law to include the use 
of child soldiers, enslavement of women as sex slaves, terror tactics 
                                                                                                                                           
271. Rep. of the Int’l Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, U.N. Doc. A/69/206-S/2014/546 
(Aug.1, 2014). 
272. Rep. of the Int’l Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Report on the Completion Strategy 
of the Int’l Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, U.N. Doc. S/2015/340 (May 15, 2015). 
273. See Drumbl, supra note 262, at 45-48. 
274. Id. at 47. 
275. Id. at 46. 
276. Id. at 55. 
277. Id. at 52-61. 
278. Stephen J. Rapp, The Compact Mode in International Criminal Justice: The Special 
Court for Sierra Leone, 57 DRAKE L. REV. 11, 13-15 (2008). 
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that involved chopping off the hands and arms of civilians, rape, 
murder, and the exploitation of blood diamonds (pillage). 279  The 
victims were men and women, infants, children and adults, largely 
civilians of all ages. In fact, the rebel groups often targeted civilians 
rather than military or government personnel.280 
Initially, in June of 2000, Sierra Leone President Alhaji Ahmad 
Tejan Kabbah wrote UN Secretary General Kofi Annan requesting 
international assistance in setting up a special court for his country.281 
President Kabbah called for a strong court that could address human 
rights violations that had occurred over a ten-year period, noting his 
government’s experience in negotiating with the rebels over the failed 
Lome peace process,282 and the fact that Sierra Leone had a decimated 
legal infrastructure and lacked the resources to dispense credible 
justice.283 
Eventually, the SCSL was created by an agreement between the 
United Nations and the GoSL.284  While the UN Security Council 
declined to create a court under its Chapter VII authority, it did direct 
the Secretary General to “negotiate an agreement with the 
Government of Sierra Leone to create an independent special 
court.”285 The UN Security Council recommended that the subject 
matter jurisdiction of the special court should include “crimes against 
humanity, war crimes and other serious violations of international 
humanitarian law, as well as crimes under relevant Sierra Leonean 
                                                                                                                                           
279. Id. at 14-17.                             
280. Id. at 14. 
281. Charles Chernor Jalloh, Special Court for Sierra Leone: Achieving Justice? 32 
MICH. J. INT’L L. 395, 398-99 (2011). 
282. In July 1999, the Government of Sierra Leone and the rebels reached a peace 
agreement that was quickly dishonored by the rebels. See Rapp, supra note 278, at 19. This 
raises a question of whether the rebel leaders committed an act of perfidy under customary 
international law. See also Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, Customary International 
Humanitarian Law, supra note 25. 
283. See Rapp, supra note 278, at 19. 
284. Agreement Between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone and 
Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, Jan. 16, 2002, 2178 U.N.T.S. 138; U.N. Doc. 
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by both the GoSL and the Secretary General, provides for a prosecutor appointed by the 
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285. S.C. Res. 1315 (Aug. 14, 2000). 
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law committed within the territory of Sierra Leone,” and that the 
“special court should have personal jurisdiction over persons who 
bear the greatest responsibility for the commission of the crimes.”286 
It is also noteworthy that the SCSL) had temporal jurisdictions for 
crimes committed after November 30, 1996, even though the civil war 
had started in March 1991. While there were apparently important 
political and legal considerations involving the court’s jurisdictional 
reach, this choice created a substantial “impunity gap.”287 Ultimately, 
the SCSL conducted three main trials in Sierra Leone with the fourth, 
involving Charles Taylor, held at the Hague. 288  One interesting 
problem faced by the tribunal involved the July 1999 Lome amnesty 
agreement and the claim that it would be an abuse of discretion for 
the SCSL to try persons for crimes covered under that agreement.289 
Here, the SCSL addressed that problem by concluding that,  
[The] prosecution of the accused by an independent autonomous 
court, initiated by an independent prosecutor and not brought in 
the name of Sierra Leone, is not tainted by whatever undertaking 
any accused claiming the benefit of the amnesty may have 
believed he had from the Government of Sierra Leone.290 
There were some important differences between the Chapter 
VII-based ICTR and the treaty-based SCSL.291 First, as a Chapter VII 
court, the ICTR was able to benefit from funding collected by the 
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287. Abdul Tejan-Cole, The Special Court for Sierra Leone, 1 AFR. HUM. RTS. L.J. 107, 
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circumstances where the crimes occurred”). 
289 . Prosecutor v. Morris Kallon (2004) Case No. SCSL-2004-15-AR72(E); Brima 
Bazzy Kamara (2004) Case No. SCSL-2004-16-AR72 (E) Decision on Challenge to 
Jurisdiction: Lomé Accord Amnesty. 
290. See id. para. 90. 
291 . Stephen J. Rapp, The Compact Model in International Criminal Justice: The 
Special Court for Sierra Leone, 57 DRAKE L. REV. 11, 21-23 (2008). 
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United Nations and through the use of its authorities to mandate state 
(third party) cooperation on issues such as the arrest, detention, and 
transfer of accused persons.292 Second, as a treaty-based court, the 
SCSL was able to avoid UN rules on procurement and personnel, but 
while having to cope with problems associated with soliciting 
financial support from outside donors.293 Unlike the earlier ICTR that 
had been located in Arusha, Tanzania, about 500 miles from Kigali, 
the SCSL was based in Freetown so that it could readily hear from 
witnesses and make it possible for the Sierra Leonean people to 
following the proceedings. Indeed, some sixty percent of the court’s 
employees were citizens of Sierra Leone.294 In other words, a treaty-
based court offers an opportunity for much more local “ownership” 
and public education about its efforts. 
The Sierra Leone treaty-based, mixed tribunal would be a useful 
precedent for the ICC to create a similar tribunal—with broad subject 
matter, personal and temporal jurisdiction—for the entire scope and 
duration of the Uganda-LRA conflict. 295  In fact, the UN Security 
Council expressly provided for the broad subject matter jurisdiction:  
 . . . to help foster a sense of local ownership of the SCSL and its 
processes; to allow greater flexibility to the Prosecutor to pick 
and choose which of national and or international offenses to 
charge suspects with; and finally, to cast a wider net to ensure 
that the leaders responsible for the atrocities would not escape 
punishment.296 
Like Sierra Leone, Uganda has experienced a prolonged period of 
civil war and instability in the north with widespread human rights 
abuses by the rebel groups involving child combatants and novel 
                                                                                                                                           
292. See id. at 26-28 (relating problems associated with the arrest of Charles Taylor). See 
also Magnarella, Justice in Africa, supra note 263, at 43. 
293. See Rapp, supra note 291, at 21-22. 
294. Id. at 34. 
295. The Rome Statute allows the Court to provide a range of assistance activities to 
national governments such as training activities and the use of observer missions. See Rome 
Statute, supra note 14, art. 93. While there is a risk that the Court could become too closely 
involved with a host nation, making it more difficult for the Court to later criticize the 
proceedings as non-genuine, there are also great opportunities for partnership and increased 
dialogue that could increase host nation legal capacity. INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, 
INFORMAL EXPERT PAPER: THE PRINCIPLE OF COMPLEMENTARITY IN PRACTICE (2003), 
https://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/20BB4494-70F9-4698-8E30-
907F631453ED/281984/complementarity.pdf.  
296. See Jalloh, supra note 281, at 403. 
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gender crimes. In addition, some people believed that an international 
court with strong participation from Sierra Leone would be a useful 
means of excluding the use of the death penalty under national law.297 
Unlike Sierra Leone, Uganda has a strong body of constitutional, 
statutory, and decisional law, with a capable and functioning 
judiciary—albeit one that has some important shortcomings. Indeed, 
unlike the Sierra Leonean judiciary that had been heavily impacted by 
the ravages of the civil war, Uganda has a capable judiciary with 
some experience in international criminal law; Uganda could greatly 
benefit from “capacity building” on the part of the ICC, at least in a 
qualitative sense. 298  Here, the ICC could help ensure that the 
defendants have fair trial rights, something that has been lacking in 
some Ugandan criminal trials (e.g., the role of the Ugandan Police 
and/or JATT in investigating cases and detaining and interrogating 
suspects, the possible selective prosecution of Thomas Kwoyelo,299 or 
the multiple military and civilian proceedings against Colonel Kizza 
Besigye). In short, a mixed tribunal under ICC leadership could be an 
effective forum that delivers robust justice with enhanced legitimacy 
and strengthens local institutions. 
D. A Recommended Way Forward: Closing an Impunity Gap 
There are important political and legal advantages to the use of a 
hybrid approach that combines the efforts of the ICC and Uganda’s 
courts. First, and probably most important, prosecutions through a 
hybrid court involving the ICC and the Ugandan courts would serve 
the object and purpose of the Rome Statute itself. A hybrid court 
would help end the impunity for the perpetrators of serious crimes 
                                                                                                                                           
297. Id. at 401. 
298 . CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA, supra note 87, Chapter VIII 
(outlining the structures, functions, and authorities of an independent judiciary). Article 129 
permits Parliament to establish subordinate courts with appellate rights to the High Court and 
to the Court of Appeals. In other words, the ICD is a creature of Parliament—not the 
Constitution itself—and Parliament could alter the “structures, procedures and functions” of 
that court (a division of the High Court) under Article 150. A bilateral agreement between the 
ICC and Uganda could, therefore, result in mixed tribunal that has both ICC and Ugandan trial 
judges, or it could result in a pure Ugandan bench with official observers from the ICC.  
299. Nouwen, supra note 145 (stating that “[t]o date the prosecution of Kwoyelo appears 
to be a one-off case, prompted by opportunism rather than law,” and his prosecution served a 
political move in anticipation of the 2010 ICC Review Conference that was conducted in 
Kampala). 
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and contribute to the prevention of such crimes through effective 
national prosecutions.300 The ICC would be positioned to support and 
mentor the Ugandan judges, both through its staff and judges in an 
observer status, contributing to enhanced Ugandan legal capacity. 
Second, the ICC likely has the authority under the Rome Statute, 
Article 93, to affect such an international agreement without recourse 
to the Assembly of States Parties and the time consuming statutory 
amendment process under Article 7(1).301 Third, a hybrid court could 
validate the quality of the investigative and pre-trial work that already 
been completed by ICC. The court could make public and use its 
investigative work, especially as it involves crimes committed by 
members of the UPDF against either the civilian population or LRA 
members, in criminal proceedings. This would help people—both in 
northern Uganda and the international community—see that a fair and 
balanced process is taking place, enhancing the credibility of the 
tribunal.302 Fourth, the tribunal could contribute to the significant and 
positive changes in Uganda’s administration of justice over the past 
ten years. Here, the presence of ICC judges, investigators and staff 
would add credibility to the Ugandan proceedings and help the 
Ugandan judiciary work through some difficult and contentious 
material. Finally, this approach would actually incentivize other 
States that make early referrals to the ICC, knowing that if they too 
had occasion to request withdraw a referral based upon a change of 
circumstances that they might actually reap political and legal 
benefits in making a stand against impunity. 
                                                                                                                                           
300.  Rome Statute, supra note 14, pmbl. 
301. Id. art. 93 (allowing the Court to provide a range of assistance activities to State 
parties). 
302. Nouwen,  supra note 145, at 23. Some have questioned the ICC’s failure to open an 
investigation into the conduct of the UPDF. While some could argue that the LRA’s offenses 
were graver than any committed by UPDF soldiers or that there is a lack of evidence, others 
suggest that the explanation “can be found in its dependence on cooperation of the Ugandan 
government for its case against the LRA—had the [Office of the Prosecutor] antagonised the 
Ugandan government by investigating and prosecuting its members or subordinates, chances 
would have been slim that Uganda would cooperate in the ICC’s case against the LRA in the 
way it has.” Id. See also Anne Mugisa & Hillary Nsambu, ICC clears UPDF in the north, 
NEW VISION (Kampala) (Aug. 30, 2008), http://www.newvision.co.ug/new_vision/news/
1182172/icc-clears-updf-north (explaining that the ICC has not found sufficient evidence 
against the UPDF to warrant indictments against any of its officers). 
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There has been notable antagonism between many African 
leaders over the past ten years and the ICC.303 Some African heads of 
state believe that there has been an excessive emphasis on African 
cases, while other leaders—particularly leaders in the political 
opposition parties—believe that President Museveni and some of his 
senior officers should be prosecuted for crimes that they themselves 
have committed over the course of the same conflicts. President 
Museveni, while speaking at the UN General Assembly in September 
2013, spoke of “African anger” in that its positions on African issues 
had been ignored.304 In short, an ICC initiative that uses a bilateral 
approach, combining the work of the court and the Ugandan judiciary, 
could help alleviate some of the accumulated antagonism between the 
court and African leaders. A joint proceeding, especially one based in 
East Africa, could provide increased transparency and legitimacy to 
its proceedings. This is an initiative that the ICC should support; it 
could help the court maintain its long-term relationships with many 
African nations. Also, this is an initiative that Uganda should support, 
as it could give Uganda increased voice in the court’s proceedings 
while enhancing its own national capacity. 
A bilateral ICC-Uganda agreement should address the following 
issues: 
 It should require that all LRA criminal offenses be heard 
by the ICD, supported by ICC staff and with ICC trial 
judges in an observer status (i.e., a mentoring role) 
                                                                                                                                           
303. See, e.g., Frederic Musisi & Nelson Wesonga, Is Museveni attack on ICC for Pan-
Africanism or personal reasons?, DAILY MONITOR (Kampala) (Dec. 17, 2014), 
http://www.monitor.co.ug/artsculture/Reviews/Is-Museveni-attack-on-ICC-for-Pan-
Africanism-or-personal/-/691232/2559688/-/ju1ffu/-/index.html. Indeed, President Museveni 
had earlier attacked the ICC at the 2013 inauguration of Kenya’s President Uhuru Muigai 
Kenyatta. According to press, “Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni told the gathering of 
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Kenyan voters for rejecting “the blackmail” of the ICC by electing as president Kenyatta, who 
is scheduled to stand trial at the court in July. Museveni claimed unnamed states have sought 
to abuse the ICC for their own agenda.” See also Tom Maliti, Ugandan President attacks ICC 
during Kenyatta inauguration, INT’L JUSTICE MONITOR (Apr. 9, 2013), 
http://www.ijmonitor.org/2013/04/ugandan-president-attacks-icc-during-kenyatta-
inauguration/. See also AFRICA AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT (Werle, et. al. 
eds., 2014) (providing the most comprehensive treatment of this important topic with a range 
of useful contributions by leading experts in the field of international criminal justice). 
304. Museveni Attacks ICC at UN Summit in New York, INSIDER (Kampala) (Sept. 25, 
2013), http://www.theinsider.ug/museveni-attacks-icc-at-un-summit-in-new-york/. 
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 It should require that all UPDF criminal offenses be 
heard by a general court martial, also supported by ICC 
staff and with ICC trial judges in an observer status (i.e., 
a mentoring role) 
 The combined tribunals should be based in the ICTY 
court spaces in Arusha, Tanzania with court security 
provided by the ICC or a named third party 
 All appellate issues should be addressed through the 
Ugandan appellate processes, with ICC judges in an 
observer status for any such proceedings 
 It should address all criminal offenses committed in 
violation of the Ugandan Penal Code, the UPDF Act 
(such as arms and uniform violations by LRA members 
or war crimes by the UPDF), or IHL over the course of 
the Uganda-LRA conflict from January 1, 1990, to the 
present and continuing 
 It should apply the extra-territoriality (universal 
jurisdiction) provisions of Ugandan law as it applies to 
any crimes committed in southern Sudan, the DRC, or 
the CAR 
 It should address all crimes committed by the named 
LRA defendants presently under indictment by the 
ICC,305 as well as any other named senior officers of the 
LRA or the UPDF, as identified by the ICC 
 It should use the evidence, to include witnesses and 
documents, provided by the ICC 
 It should exclude the application of Uganda Amnesty 
Law 
 It should exclude the application of the death penalty 
under Ugandan law, with the sentencing limited to a 
term of years or life imprisonment, as provided for under 
Article 77 of the Rome Statute 
 It should not recognize any defense of immunity 
 It should provide for the costs of witness travel and 
protection 
                                                                                                                                           
305. The ICC would not necessarily have to rescind the existing indictments; the ICC 
could simply deputize the combined tribunal to hear the matter as if it were the ICC, thus 
preserving the integrity of the original indictments while bolstering the new tribunal. 
326 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 40:2 
 Its proceedings should be open to members of the press 
There are also four important practical issues that must be 
considered with this tribunal. Initially, Uganda will likely have to 
amend both the 2005 UPDF Act and the 2010 ICC Act to ensure that 
the agreement has parliamentary approval and to avoid any 
unnecessary complications under Ugandan law. In one example, the 
commitment to prosecute named individuals could be considered 
inconsistent with the DPP’s prosecutorial discretion.306 In a second 
example, the presence of ICC observers, staffing, and support could 
be construed as impairing the independence of the Ugandan 
judiciary. 307  Thus, parliamentary approval would facilitate clear 
working relationships between ICC and Ugandan officials. 
Second, the tribunal should use the evidence accumulated from 
the ICC’s investigation of the cases over the past ten years. The ICC 
has performed commendable work in investigating the conflict, at 
least from the start of its jurisdiction in July of 2002. The ICC’s 
investigators, as well as the body of reliable evidence that it has 
amassed, have considerable credibility over the Ugandan Police, 
JATT, and other domestic law enforcement organizations. This 
should help ensure a fair trial for the defendants untainted by any 
claims about incompetent, corrupt, or abusive Ugandan law 
enforcement practices that have previously raised alarms in the 
international community. This should also reassure skeptical 
audiences that any offenses committed by the UPDF are not simply 
whitewashed over. 
Third, there should be cost-sharing between the ICC and the 
Ugandan government. Based upon the experiences of earlier 
international criminal tribunals, it could take the ICC-Uganda tribunal 
two to five years to try each case. Still, with support from the ICC 
judges and staff, Uganda should be able to prosecute the cases much 
faster than it would otherwise if left to its own devices. Thus, ICC 
funding could be used to hire and train additional court staff, provide 
                                                                                                                                           
306.  The Constitution of the Republic of Uganda provides that: “In the exercise of the 
functions conferred on him or her by this article, the Director of Public Prosecutions shall not 
be subject to the direction or control of any person or authority. CONSTITUTION OF THE 
REPUBLIC OF UGANDA, supra note 87, art. 120(6). 
307 . Id. art. 128 (stating “(1) In the exercise of judicial power, the courts shall be 
independent and shall not be subject to the control or direction of any person or authority. (2) 
No person or authority shall interfere with the courts or judicial officers in the exercise of their 
judicial functions”). 
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for improved record-keeping and evidence tracking systems, and 
ensure witness availability and protection. 
Fourth, this hybrid tribunal should be located in the ICTY court 
in Arusha, Tanzania. Thus, the court would be based in the region and 
help draw African support. It would give the hybrid court ready 
access to witnesses and evidence, while at the same time allowing 
ready access to observers to its proceedings. While there would be 
some advantage to Kampala-based proceedings, to include ease of 
access to Ugandan victims and witnesses, the use of ICTY facilities 
would provide for better court security and give the court more 
control over its own proceedings while avoiding any corruption or 
outside political interference. Indeed, as Naluwairo indicated, Uganda 
lacks “alternative special or high-security civilian courts.”308 In short, 
an Arusha-based tribunal would be more focused on the issues at 
hand, as opposed to one based in Kampala and open to outside 
pressures, and more accessible to African observers and witnesses, as 
opposed to one based at the Hague and less accessible to interested 
parties. 
This approach would provide the ICC with an opportunity to 
support national prosecutions under international standards for a fair 
trial. While the ICC-Uganda tribunal might only prosecute a limited 
number of persons, it could enhance Uganda’s capacity to handle 
complex criminal cases and ensure a fair trial through effective 
international oversight. 
VI. CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
The Uganda-LRA conflict is best characterized as a non-
international armed conflict between an “organized armed group” and 
the GoU, at least until December of 2008—after which time the 
UPDF has been conducting counter-terrorism operations against a 
                                                                                                                                           
308. Naluwairo, supra note 103, at 179-80. It is also noteworthy that Uganda’s lead 
prosecutor for the high-profile trial of the thirteen terrorists accused of taking part in the July 
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criminal organization. This unique group, while it has origins as a 
rebel/insurgent organization, has committed a wide-ranging terror 
campaign over the past twenty years that has resulted in the death or 
mutilation of perhaps 100,000 civilians, in the kidnapping of tens of 
thousands of children for use as soldiers or sex slaves, in the theft or 
destruction of civilian property, and in the displacement of millions 
from their homes. While there have been a limited number of claims 
regarding offenses committed by the UPDF, these claims involve 
events that occurred largely in the 1990s. Uganda has an obligation to 
bring all culpable persons, either LRA or UPDF, to account for the 
full range of offenses under both international and national law. 
Despite the broad coverage provided by Uganda criminal law, 
there are significant drawbacks to its use against unprivileged 
belligerents.309 First, Uganda’s courts lack the experience trying cases 
involving war crimes and many ethnic groups in Uganda, especially 
the Acholi, do not trust Museveni’s government. Uganda’s limited 
experience with war crimes cases would only be compounded by the 
complexity of international law issues. Second, the LRA depredations 
have occurred over a protracted period encompassing parts of four 
countries, each country having varying obligations under international 
law. This means that while Uganda may have considerable evidence 
against the LRA and its members for offenses committed in Uganda, 
it will have difficulty gathering some evidence and foreign witnesses 
for trials in Ugandan courts based on offenses committed in either the 
DRC or the CAR. Third, there is some complexity in the international 
norms regarding war crimes, as well as the appropriate punishments 
thereto (e.g., the death penalty), committed by children. 
This conflict calls for justice and accountability measures which 
would be best administered through an impartial, international 
tribunal with the broad ranging expertise and resources that could 
provide closure to the victims while promoting international peace 
and security in a war-torn region. A Ugandan tribunal, with direct 
assistance by ICC judges and staff, could serve to legitimize the role, 
functions and work of the ICC to date, enhance the capacity of 
Uganda legal institutions, and enhance the prospects for peace and 
accountability throughout the Great Lakes Region. 
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